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Introduction
Disruptions to transportation systems have farreaching consequences in terms of safety and
security. There is an urgent need to reduce
vulnerability of critical transportation infrastructure
and minimize the economic impacts of such
disruptions.
Because critical assets and the
perceptions of criticality differ from state to state,
based on various factors such as nature of the assets
and the location and environment of the assets, it is
necessary for Indiana Department of Transportation
(INDOT) to review and evaluate its assets. The
American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) suggested
preliminary guidelines for vulnerability assessment
of transportation assets.
In response to the new terrorist threat, state
transportation agencies have been forced to revise

and update their emergency response
capabilities. A review of Federal Homeland
Security measures in emergency management
was undertaken to provide a basis for such
integration, including the National Incident
Management System and the National Response
Plan released by the DHS. An analysis of
existing Indiana emergency management
practices was performed, and issues in
INDOT’s
current
emergency
response
procedures were identified. A review of best
practices in emergency response was developed
that will serve as a guide for the future
implementation of security measures by
INDOT.

Findings
The results of the research include:
1.

A list of top 25 critical assets in each
district and a general methodology to
combine different assets from districts to
obtain a comprehensive statewide list.

2.

Recommendations to state DOTs for
identifying and assessing critical assets
with respect to Vulnerability and
Criticality.

3.

Suggested countermeasures to reduce the
vulnerability of a given asset based on its
relevant characteristics.

4.

Reminder that INDOT needs to make sure
that its current emergency response

12-3 1/09 JTRP-2007/19

practices are integrated with the practices
in place by emergency agencies at all
levels.
This includes an Emergency
Operations Plan that establishes the
procedures INDOT personnel at all levels
need to follow when responding to an
emergency.
The procedures included
should consider following an all-hazards
approach, ensure proper integration and
interoperability, and redundancy and
Continuity of Operations. The EOP should
also ensure INDOT personnel safety during
the response efforts.
5.

INDOT should adopt the Incident
Command System as its organizational
structure
for
emergency
response
operations.

INDOT Division of Research

West Lafayette, IN 47906

Implementation
Maintain an active Counter-Terrorism and
Security Task Council within INDOT to
coordinate elements within INDOT and
coordinate with agencies outside INDOT. Adopt

the structures and procedures described in the
report, such as the Incident Command System
and an all-hazards Emergency Operations Plan,
which are becoming standard across the country.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The events of September 11, 2001 revealed the vulnerability of transportation systems
and the massive consequences of attacks on them. Tom Ridge, Secretary for Homeland
Security, said “The terrorist only has to be right once; we have to be right all the time.”
(DHS, 2003). These words explain the difficulty and the importance of protecting the U.S.
infrastructure against terrorist attacks. The first step is identifying what to protect,
because of the limited resources for any agency. That makes it necessary to prioritize
assets so that the most important asset is protected first. In the case of terrorist threats,
prioritizing assets is done based on the assets’ vulnerability and criticality.
This chapter provides an overview of the importance of assessing and prioritizing
assets and implementing security measures for transportation assets. The research
concentrates on assets maintained and operated by Indiana Department of Transportation
(INDOT). The chapter also includes the problem statement, scope, objectives and
approach for this research.
1.1. Background
A secure transportation system is critical to overall national security from
terrorism. Groups or individuals motivated to terrorize or injure people or the economy
often have transportation facilities as a target or a tool. Transportation activities comprise
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12 percent of the gross domestic economy, and virtually all of the economy is dependent
on a functioning transportation system. Disruption to any critical link in the
transportation system may cause serious economic harm. Thus, securing the
transportation system is a critical consideration in overall security planning.
Terrorists may be motivated to cause personal injury to concentrations of people
or to strike at symbolic targets, many of which are a part of the transportation system.
Examples are the Golden Gate Bridge and other high-profile transportation facilities.
Terrorists need to deliver the people, munitions, explosives, biological agents, or other
destructive elements in their acts of terrorism. Thus, transportation is also an element of
the delivery of terror. Collectively, the transportation sector is intimately involved in the
security of our society and, in many respects, will be a front-line area of focus in
enhancing security.
The future of transportation will be very much influenced by security
considerations (Polzin, 2003). Surface transportation in the United States is an
extraordinarily large and complex system. It is responsible for the movement of vast
numbers of passengers and vast quantities of freight. It includes many thousands of
interdependent operators. The system's efficiency and convenience are essential to the
strength of our economy, the security of our nation, and the quality of our lives.
Transportation agencies have taken steps to increase the security of their assets.
Two important references are AASHTO’s “Guidelines for Vulnerability Assessment of
Critical Infrastructure (2002)” and “Guidelines for Emergency Response (2002)”. These
guides are based on the responses from 32 states to a USDOT survey. Based on the

2

responses and various levels of security measures implemented by DOTs in their states,
AASTHO published these reports as preliminary guidelines for use by state DOTs.
Although efforts are being made to deal with emergency situations like natural
hazards such as fires and hurricanes, less effort has been focused on preventing terrorist
attacks. Prevention begins with identifying what needs to be protected. Thus, there is a
need to identify critical assets in order to use resources to strengthen those assets that are
most important.
This study presents methods used by different agencies to assess vulnerabilities.
Also presented is a method developed specifically to address Indiana’s needs and that can
serve as a tool to identify critical assets for INDOT in their districts and statewide.
Countermeasures are suggested to address the security needs for the assets identified as
critical and vulnerable.
1.2. Problem Statement

Emergencies arising from terrorist threats highlight the need for transportation agencies
to minimize the vulnerability of people and assets through incident prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery. Agencies are seeking to reduce the chances that
transportation vehicles and facilities are targets or instruments of terrorist attacks and to
be prepared to respond to and recover from such possibilities. The awareness levels in all
the spheres of government have heightened and efforts are being made across all areas to
strengthen security. The activity involves agencies at federal, state and local levels, as
well as academia and private organizations.
Transportation security has two aspects to it:
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1. Evaluating the ability of a system or application, including current security procedures
and controls, to withstand assault, which is vulnerability assessment, and
2. Developing procedures to ensure efficient response to a terrorist attack, which is
emergency response.
Faced with threats to the security of the transportation system, there is an urgent need to
develop systematic efforts to protect the physical well-being of users of transportation
assets by reducing the vulnerability of critical transportation infrastructure and services.
Despite this pressing need, there is limited experience with the qualitative or quantitative
methods to identify vulnerabilities or the consequences of such disruptive attacks.
(Srinivasan, 2004).
Although AASHTO developed guidelines to conduct vulnerability assessment,
critical assets differ from state to state. It is necessary for INDOT to develop its own
methods or adapt the AASHTO guidelines to suit its particular needs. The prevention part
of transportation security begins with vulnerability assessment. “Vulnerability describes
the non-operability of the network under varying strenuous conditions (i.e., the
susceptibility to fail to function)”. (Husdal, 2004).
Identifying and evaluating how vulnerable and critical the assets are is a major
challenge, given the subjective nature of the factors involved. There is a need to develop
systematic methods to assess the vulnerability of existing and emerging infrastructure,
reduce the occurrence of disruptive attacks and, if possible, prevent the terrorist attacks
by strengthening assets. Selecting an asset from a statewide list of assets that have been
identified at the local level is another challenging task. In order to help agencies apply
their limited resources to secure their assets, this study focuses on identifying and
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developing methods to prioritize assets based on their vulnerability and criticality level.
This study also suggests several countermeasures appropriate for specific asset types.
1.3. Research Objectives and Scope
The objective of this project is to provide a flexible, transferable method to identify the
vulnerability of assets and address transportation issues related to security from the
perspective of prevention. The specific objectives of this research include:
•

Determine the best practices available for vulnerability assessment of
transportation assets.

•

Determine whether accepted and usable methods exist for conducting
vulnerability assessments on a statewide basis.

•

Develop a methodology appropriate for INDOT, or adapt an existing
methodology to suit Indiana’s needs.

•

Test the suggested methodology in INDOT districts.

•

Develop a method to combine assets from various districts.

•

Develop countermeasures to reduce the vulnerabilities of an asset.

•

Develop recommendations for INDOT for conducting vulnerability
assessments, based on the results obtained from case studies.

In conducting this study, we surveyed the seven INDOT districts in Indiana. Each district
selected 25 critical assets. We developed a method to identify the vulnerabilities of the
175 assets. This phase of vulnerability assessment classifies which of the identified
critical assets in each district are vulnerable. A method is developed to compare the asset
lists from each district. Once the most critical and vulnerable assets are identified, more
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refined vulnerability assessment at an asset level could be conducted using the AASHTO
guidelines. Because the factors that affect vulnerability do not all have the same weights,
the analytical hierarchical process is used to obtain the weights. General countermeasures
are suggested, based on USDOT and Virginia DOT guidelines, which are appropriate for
different asset types.
1.4. Organization of the Report
This report consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the motivation and the
background for this research. Presented in Chapter 2 is the literature review, which
discusses transportation issues with regards to security. Also, discussed in Chapter 2 are
various methodologies available to assess the vulnerability and criticality of
transportation assets. Chapter 2 also discusses the various multi-criteria decision methods
available. Chapter 3 presents the framework for the development of vulnerability
assessment methodology and the prioritization methods for selecting the assets from
various districts. Chapter 4 discusses the results obtained from the surveys. Chapter 5
provides a set of recommendations to INDOT for conducting vulnerability assessment.
Chapter 6 provides a summary of the results and the vulnerability assessment
methodology

developed.

It

also

includes

recommendations for future research.
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limitations

of

this

approach

and

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Overview of Transportation Security and Vulnerability Assessment
Transportation infrastructures make attractive targets for intentional harmful attacks—
they are highly visible, carry large numbers of commuters, and are very accessible.
Although research work on natural disasters and accidents is relevant, willful attacks pose
some unique issues and challenges—primarily because these acts are intelligent,
unpredictable, and deliberate in generating catastrophic consequences. Enhancing the
security of our transportation system is one of the highest priorities of transportation
agencies in the wake of September 11. Informed decisions regarding vulnerability
assessment and emergency response are essential for secure and safe operation of
highway assets.
The need to protect critical infrastructures, as well as information, people,
equipment, facilities and operations, requires a comprehensive systematic evaluation of
Vulnerability and Criticality to improve overall organizational security. This chapter
provides a synthesis of transportation security issues. Also, this chapter summarizes the
different methods that are available to conduct vulnerability assessments in various
degrees of detail and for different assets. Various multi-criteria decisions suitable to the
problem are also discussed.
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2.2. Transportation and Security
The executive order issued by The White House (Executive Order, 1996) identifies
certain national infrastructures so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have
a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. Some of
these critical infrastructures are telecommunications, electrical power systems, storage
and transportation of gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water supply
systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and stability
and continuity of government. There are two types of threats possible: physical threats to
tangible property and cyber threats. Cyber threats are in the nature of electronic, radiofrequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or communications components
that control critical infrastructures.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the majority of works published on the subject of
transportation security were focused on protecting public surface transportation. A series
of transportation security reports by the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) became
some of the most read literature in the nation. Brian Michael Jenkins (Jenkins, 2001)
wrote “Contemporary terrorists have made public transportation a new theatre of
operations.” The best source of information, before and after September 11, 2001, dealing
with methods and techniques for the protection of infrastructure can be found in the
Army Field Manual (2001). Most of the countermeasures suggested in the AASHTO
guidelines were based on this manual.
The major focus of the existing literature was found to be aviation security, mass
transit security, and port security, which implies these modes are higher-order terrorist
targets than highways because of their high visibility and high cost facilities. GAO (2003)
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supports the findings of the other literature reviewed and indicates that efforts to
strengthen transportation security face several long-term institutional challenges that
include (1) developing a comprehensive risk management approach; (2) ensuring funding
needs are identified and prioritized and that costs are controlled; (3) establishing effective
coordination among the many responsible public and private entities; (4) ensuring
adequate workforce competence and staffing levels; and (5) implementing security
standards for transportation facilities, workers, and security equipment.

2.3. Components of Vulnerability Assessment
Assets can be defined as the infrastructure, facilities, equipment, information, and
personnel that comprise each transportation system. Vulnerabilities in highway
transportation generally fall into three categories:
1. Physical facilities.
2. The vehicles (private and commercial motor carriers) operating on the system.
3. The information infrastructure that monitors and manages the flow of goods,
vehicles, and people on the highway system. (AASHTO, 2002).
The vulnerability assessment procedure is usually performed in stages that are similar to
or a slight variation of the steps described below.
•

Identifying critical assets to be assessed.

•

Assessing vulnerabilities and criticality

•

Assessing consequences

•

Identifying countermeasures

•

Estimating the cost of countermeasures

9

As part of this study on “synreport of best practices for transportation security”, a
thorough literature review to determine the methodologies developed so far has been
conducted. Then a methodology that could be used or tailored for use, by INDOT
officials for identifying critical and vulnerable highway infrastructure projects on a
statewide basis was developed. It was applied to INDOT’s seven districts.

2.4. Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies
A process is necessary for prioritizing all INDOT transportation assets with respect to
their vulnerability in terms of their criticality and the ability to deter, deny, detect, delay,
and defend against terrorist attacks. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Office
for Domestic Preparedness identified a need to examine and classify various types of
vulnerability assessment methodologies, software, and tools that could be used by state
and local governments to assess the vulnerabilities of their assets. Forty four
methodologies were considered in the study. (DHS, 2003). In the wake of September 11,
2001, several good publications have been developed. One of the objectives of this
research is to synthesize the best practices of transportation security relating to
vulnerability assessment (VA). The relevant methodologies for VA are discussed below.
2.4.1. AASHTO Methodology

As a part of the efforts to improve surface transportation security, NCHRP-funded
projects were performed for the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Security Task Force. Two guidelines were
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developed and distributed to member states in May 2002. The two guidelines address (1)
vulnerability assessment and (2) highway emergency response plans, which will be
discussed later in this report. These reports give a general overview of the framework to
conduct vulnerability assessment of transportation assets in the states. (AASHTO, 2003).
The vulnerability assessment guide is discussed at some length, because these guidelines
are the primary basis for this study.
“A Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical Asset Identification and
protection” (AASHTO, 2002) was prepared under the direction of the National
Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) for American Association of State
Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO). The AASHTO guide addresses our
nation’s vulnerability assessment needs for highway transportation subsequent to the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. A terrorist attack against the nation’s highway
infrastructure could result in many injuries and fatalities, the disruption of vehicular
traffic and commerce, and significant regional or national economic losses. The intent of
the AASHTO Task Force was to discover what is being done or is under development in
selected states and to provide “best practices” in the form of a guide or handbook that
state DOTs may use to prepare for and respond to future acts of terrorism.
The AASHTO guide deals with physical highway transportation assets, such as bridges,
tunnels, roadways, interchanges, toll houses, and roadside infrastructure (e.g., signs,
barriers, sensors).
The AASHTO ‘Guide for Vulnerability Assessment’ was developed as a tool for State
Departments of Transportation (DOTs) to:

11

•

Assess the vulnerabilities of their physical assets, such as bridges, tunnels,
roadways, and inspection and traffic operation facilities.

•

Develop possible countermeasures to deter or detect and delay the consequences
of terrorist threats to such assets;

•

Estimate the capital and operating costs of such countermeasures; and

•

Improve security operational planning for better protection against future acts of
terrorism.

The AASHTO vulnerability assessment guide can benefit
•

State DOTs, including senior officials involved in the initial planning state of the
vulnerability assessment process.

•

Mid-level managers charged with developing assessment plans and procedures

•

Field personnel who will likely conduct the assessment of critical assets.

The AASHTO vulnerability assessment guide can be used as a basic framework to build
and plan the complete vulnerability assessment of state assets. The guide recommends
that state DOTs organize and manage a multidisciplinary team whose members must
possess a working knowledge of department’s mission, its critical assets, and its policies,
plans and procedures. The AASHTO vulnerability assessment guide also identifies the
activities typically required by the team to conduct vulnerability assessment. The
vulnerability assessment process presented in this guide is derived from a careful review
of information compiled from state, federal, and international agencies and their
personnel. The guide provides six steps for conducting a vulnerability assessment of
highway transportation assets. They are shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Six steps for conducting vulnerability assessment (AASHTO, 2002)
The six steps represent an integrated and iterative approach to vulnerability assessment.
These six steps provide a straightforward method for examining critical assets and
identifying cost effective countermeasures to guard against terrorism. For each step, the
objective is clearly stated, the practice of that step by the other state and federal agencies
is referenced, a detailed approach is described, and illustrative examples are provided in
the guide. The criteria used in selecting preferred approaches include availability,
accessibility, transparency, replicability, reasonableness, scalability, robustness, cost
effectiveness, and modularity.
Given that the information on threats, vulnerabilities and consequences will probably
come from sources external to the state DOT, the multidisciplinary team will need to
either include or frequently interact with the state or local organizations representing law
enforcement, fire services, public safety, public health, and emergency management. To
address the issues and to ensure the team is well equipped to proceed with the assessment
procedures, training exercises should be held prior to vulnerability assessment.
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Phases of vulnerability assessment according to AASHTO guidelines:
In the first phase (pre-assessment), the department assembles the assessment team,
conducts team training exercises, makes contact with external organizations, plans and
schedules the vulnerability assessment process, and collects the required resources.
In the second phase (assessment), the team conducts the vulnerability assessment by
making use of the available data sources, physically examining critical assets,
interviewing personnel, assessing the data, and making recommendations on
countermeasures.
In the third phase (post-assessment), the department, working with the team, develops a
strategy for implementing the recommended countermeasures. Activities in this phase
may include cost-benefit analyses, trade-off studies, and procuring equipment and
services.
The AASHTO vulnerability assessment guide describes general methods that apply to a
wide range of asset types. The vulnerability assessment methods in the guide are
applicable to any state DOT once they are modified.
2.4.2. Federal Transit Agency Method
Federal Transit Administration (FTA, 2003) proposed a model that prioritizes system
factors, so that transit systems may more effectively ensure the security of its assets. The
FTA method aims at identifying the critical assets with respect to transit systems. The
process of selecting anti-terrorism measures evaluates potential threats, the consequences
of those threats, and the techniques available to mitigate them. This framework is
presented in Figure 2 and has five steps:
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•

asset criticality;

•

threat evaluation;

•

vulnerability assessment;

•

countermeasure investigation; and

•

security measure selection.

1.ASSET
CRITICALITY

2.THREAT
EVALUATION

3.
VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT

4. COUNTERMEASURE INVESTIGATION

DESIGN
CRITERIA

PHYSICAL
SECURITY
MEASURES

INCIDENT
RESPONSE
MEASURES

CONTINGENCY
PLANNING AND
MEASURES

5.
COUNTERMEASURE

SELECTION

ACTION
PLAN

Figure 2 Risk Assessment Process
Identify asset criticality: The structured management of overall security risks
begins with an understanding of the relative criticality and value of the transportation
system’s assets. In this method, the prioritization approach includes Criticality
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Assessments and Critical Factor Evaluations. In deciding which assets or categories of
assets have the greatest impact if lost, damaged, or disrupted, two different approaches
were considered: critical factor evaluation approach and check-list based assessment.
These approaches vary primarily based on the presence of passengers and
employees and the use of the asset by outside responders, such as emergency responders
and the US military.

These two approaches are also applied based on similarities

between and among classes of transportation assets.
For transportation systems, such as public transit, the General Accounting Office
(GAO), in its 1988 assessment of the vulnerability of public transportation to acts of
terrorism and extreme violence, entitled Domestic Terrorism: Prevention Efforts in
Selected Federal Courts and Mass Transit Systems developed a useful analytical tool to
prioritize critical assets. This tool assesses the criticality of each transit asset according
to the impact of its disruption on people (either the public or employees) and the ability
of the system to function (GAO, 1988)
In the critical factor evaluation approach, each asset, or category of asset, must be
identified, and then using a relative or quantitative scale, evaluated for the impacts its loss
would have on passengers, employees and system functioning during different times of
day (peak and off-peak service). Impacts can be measured in terms of the number of
passengers and employees present in a given location within an asset who could be
affected, as well as the cost of replacing the lost asset, including all indirect costs, such
temporary services required until the asset is rebuilt, liability and workers compensation
claims, and changes in insurance coverage. Each transit system must assign its own
values for ranking impacts, based on its experience and available information.
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The GAO recommends the use of high, medium, and low categorizations. Based
on this model, Table1 below presents the results of analysis performed concerning the
criticality of generic bus assets. The results of the analysis shows public transportation
systems can identify single assets and categories of assets whose loss would potentially
result in high casualties or system disruption.
Table 1. Analysis of Criticality of Bus Assets (FTA, 2003)
Bus Transportation Assets

Criticality (Level of Impact)

Assets

People

Terminal/Station

High1

System
Medium to High
2

•

Entrances and exits

High1

Low2

•

Escalators/elevators/stairs

High1

Low2

•

Corridors/pathways

Medium1

Low2

•

Mezzanines and concourses

High1

Low2

•

Passenger loading and

High1

Medium2

unloading
•

Vendors

High1

Low2

•

Restrooms

Medium

Low2

1

•

Support facilities and storage

Low

•

Administrative/employee

Medium to High1
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Medium to
High2
Medium to

•

High3

facilities

Transit Center

High1

Low 2

•

Entrances and exits

Medium to High1

Low2

•

Passenger waiting areas

Medium to High1

Low2

•

Restrooms

Medium1

Low2

•

Passenger loading and

Medium to High1

Low2

unloading
•

Vendors

Medium1

Low2

•

Support facilities

Low1

Low2

Multi-use/intermodal connection

High1

Bus stops and shelters

Medium to High1

Low

Vehicles (buses and vans)

Medium to High

Low

Roadways

Low

Low

High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes

Low

Low to Medium

ITS technology and equipment

Low

Low to Medium

Parking lots

Low to Medium

Low

Bus garages and storage facilities

Low3

High

Heavy repair facilities

Low3

Medium to High

Service and inspection facilities

Low3

Medium to High

Inventory and storage facilities

Low3

Medium

Alternative fuel facilities

Low3

High
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Low to
Medium2

Operations control center

Low3

High

Communications system

Low3

Medium to High

Revenue collection facilities

Low3

Medium

Administrative facilities

Medium to High3

Medium to High

Employee parking lots

Low to Medium3

Low

Transit police facilities

Medium to High3

Medium to High

1

Depends on what time of day incident occurs. Greater impact would be

experienced during rush hour than non-rush hours.
2

Depends on location in the system where an incident occurs. An incident at a

major transfer center or station would have greater impact than one at an
outlying bus stop. Also depends on the alternatives available, such as
redundancies, rerouting capabilities, and other factors.
3

Affects employees only.

FHWA developed an assessment methodology that uses critical asset factors to
prioritize assets (AASHTO, 2002).

For example, the factor ‘Ability to provide

protection’ has a value of 1. The factors and associated values can be obtained from the
AASHTO guide. Each of the factors is given a default value. The assignment of these
factor values to assets is binary. If the critical asset factor applies to the asset being
evaluated, then the asset receives the full value assigned to that factor. However, if the
factor does not apply, the asset is assigned a value of 0 for that factor. For each asset, the
applicable critical asset factor value is assigned. The sum of these values represents
asset’s total score, which can be used to prioritize assets.
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The selected items that form the prioritized critical asset list can then be assessed to
determine threats, vulnerabilities, consequences, and ultimately, security measures. The
threat assessment process emphasizes five factors used in the collection and analysis of
information from all sources bearing on terrorist threats. The factors are: existence,
capability, history, intensions and targeting. An example of the threat analysis factors is
shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Threat Assessment Process
Vulnerabilities largely determine the likelihood that a potential adversary will
succeed in damaging, disrupting, or destroying a prioritized critical asset. Two
approaches presented in this report are scenario-based assessment and checklist-based
assessment.
The scenario-based approach uses threat scenarios based on threat evaluation for
prioritized critical assets, and then to attempt to determine how well existing measures
identify, mitigate, or support response to each scenario. Table 2 below provides sample
scenarios used in bus transportation to support these assessments.
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Table 2. Relevant Bus Scenarios (FTA, 2003)
Bus Assets

Threats
π High-yield vehicle bomb near station
π Lower-yield explosive device in station

Bus stations

π Armed hijacking, hostage, or barricade situation in station

and/or terminals

π Chemical, biological, and nuclear release in station
π Secondary explosive device directed at emergency
responders
π Explosives placed on or under bus
π Improvised explosive device (pipe or fire bomb) on bus

Bus vehicles

π Chemical, biological, or nuclear release on bus
π Armed assault, hostage, or barricade situation on bus
π Secondary explosive device directed at emergency
responders
Fuel storage
facilities

π Explosives detonated in or near fuel farm/facilities
π Physical or information attack on bus communications

Command
Control Center

system
π Armed assault, hostage, or barricade situation
π Explosive device near or in control center
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In the checklist-based assessment, vulnerabilities are uncovered by making a
systematic survey of the security elements that provide protection to prioritized critical
assets from evaluated threats. In this process, security relies on the “defense in depth”
concept, where different rings of protection are identified, as appropriate for a specific
facility or category of facilities. Survey questions direct a detailed walk-through and
evaluation of each prioritized critical asset. The survey questions are based on agency
experience and previously developed checklists prepared by the US military, the Federal
Aviation Administration, the Department of Justice, other transportation systems, and
consultants. Countermeasures considered applicable to protecting transportation assets
are often identified in terms of their capabilities to deter, detect, and delay threats.
2.4.3. TMC Risk Assessment Methodology
The TMC Risk Assessment Methodology (SAIC, 2005) is based on best practices of
several proven risk assessment methodologies. The approach used is drawn from the
Systematic Assessment of Facility Risk (SAFR) and a methodology developed by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Domestic Preparedness toolkit along
with ideas from AASHTO’s Guide to Highway Vulnerability Assessment for Critical
Asset Identification and Protection. The TMC Risk Assessment Methodology (TMC
RAM) components include: asset identification; threat assessment; consequence
assessment; vulnerability assessment; and countermeasure development.
The components of the TMC RAM process are:
•

Asset identification

•

Threat Assessment
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•

Consequence assessment

•

Vulnerability assessment

•

Countermeasure development.

The TMC RAM evaluates relative risk to multiple assets. Relative Risk (“RR”) is a
function of the overall threat to the asset or facility (Threat, or “T”), the attractiveness of
a particular target to a given adversary (Target Attractiveness, or “TA”), the potential
consequences of a successful attack on a target (Consequences, or “C”), the ability to
deter an adversary from attempting an attack (Deterrence, or “LD,” expressed in terms of
the inability to deter, or “1-LD”), and the effectiveness of the system to prevent an attack
should one be attempted (System Effectiveness, or “LS,” expressed in terms of system
ineffectiveness, or “1-LS”).
The formula is expressed as:
RR = TA x T x C x (1-LD) x (1-LS)

(2.1)

Calculating the relative risk to one asset has limited value; it only indicates the risk to that
asset relative to the highest and lowest possible RR.
In order to limit the asset list to only those critical to the mission, it is recommended that
assets be identified based on an examination of the overall mission of the TMC, the
functions that support that mission, and the assets critical to continuation of those
functions.
A number of factors go into a terrorist’s decision to attack a target, or increase the
magnitude of potential adversaries interested in striking at a particular target.
-Knowledge that target exists.
-Availability of information about the site and security
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- Symbolic importance
-Publicity generated by attack attempt or success
-Mass casualty potential
-Perceived criticality of systems
-Potential economic disruption
-Public confidence
-Level of effort

The vulnerability assessment begins with development and documentation of a scenario
to facilitate the discussion of system effectiveness. The consequences associated with an
aggressor act can be described in a myriad of ways. In some cases the dollar value of
resources lost, stolen, damaged or destroyed as well as the cost of repair, replacement, or
substitution have provided analysts with a method for assessing consequences. The
variables that are used to assess consequences in this manual are consistent with the
results of a successful aggressor act, and include:
•

Fatalities/Casualties – Dead and injured as a result of the event.

•

Mission Downtime/Degradation – Time the facility is unable to continue
operation at full capacity or at all.

•

Economic Impact – Direct economic impact on the facility to repair or
replace (not including lawsuits, etc.).

•

Downstream Effects – The extent of the downstream impact on the
transportation system.
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2.4.4. TMC Risk Assessment Method
Xia et al. (2004) in their study proposed a framework that uses continuous traffic
monitoring data in addition to the static infrastructure characteristics. A set of indices are
developed to indicate the risk level of each component.
1. Index A reflects the static characteristics of highway components against a terrorist
attack. The characteristics include structural stability, number of alternatives, and
response resources of highway components.
2. Index B incorporates the dynamic characteristics of a highway’s network
components that could affect its risk. They include dynamic traffic flow information such
as volume, speed, occupancy, vehicle classification, and queue length. Furthermore,
weather information and work zone activities can be included.
3. Index C represents the potential of a terrorism attempt. It is the possibility of an
attack occurrence, which is estimated in terms of both functional significance and
symbolic importance of a highway component.
Thus, the risk score of a highway component can be defined as a linear combination of
the three indices.

R = (αA + βB) * C / 100
In which,
R: risk score of highway network component
A: static characteristic index
B: dynamic characteristic index
C: attack potential index
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(2.2)

α: weight of static characteristic index
β: weight of dynamic characteristic index


The values for parameters α and β can be determined through a structured decisionmaking process. All indices in this study are assumed to be independent. Also, all
attributes in each index, to be discussed below, are assumed to be independent.
The score of index A can be calculated using the following equation.
A = W A1 * a + W A2 * b + W A3 * c + W A 4 * d

(2.3)

The score of index B can be calculated using the following equation.
B = WB1 * e + WB 2 * f + WB 3 * g + WB 4 * h + WB 5 * i

(2.4)

where W’s are the weights predetermined with the help of the experts.
The probability of a terrorism attempt mainly can be measured by symbolic importance
and functional classes. Let j and k represent the attributes of functional types and
symbolic importance, respectively.
The score of index C can be calculated as follows.
C = Wc1 * j + Wc 2 * k

(2.5)

2.4.5. Comparison of Vulnerability Assessment Methodologies
The above three approaches aim at achieving similar objectives of identifying critical
assets and evaluating their vulnerabilities. These assets help in prioritizing assets when
the assessment is conducted at an asset level, where each asset is evaluated for each of
the mentioned criteria. None of the approaches deal with a system-level statewide
network nor provide an easy way to pick those assets that need immediate attention. This

26

aspect is crucial because of the limited nature of the funds available to any agency. The
TMC RAM method, although comprehensive, has extensive data needs. It is a good
model theoretically but it requires a lot of effort on the part of the experts to quantify the
value of subjective criteria like the value of the lives lost. Because the values for these
subjective criteria are predictions based on one’s knowledge and expertise, there could be
inconsistency and variance.
The AASHTO methodology, on the other hand, is more subjective and uses surveys to
obtain data. In addition, the approaches differ in terms of the identification and evaluation
criteria used to assess vulnerability and criticality. TMC RAM evaluates vulnerability and
criticality in terms of relative risk and target attractiveness where as AASHTO follows a
slightly different approach by using factors such as visibility, accessibility, and economic
impacts. Once the final list of critical assets is formulated, any of the above approaches
could be used to conduct in-depth vulnerability assessment depending on the nature of
the data available.
2.5. Other VA Methodologies used by States and Agencies
2.5.1. Iowa Plans for Critical Asset Protection
The main features of the plan are
•

Quantify 12 individual elements of potential critical assets. Eight elements
address criticality (static over time ) of the asset, while four address vulnerability,
which is dynamic and influenced by changing threat levels and implementation
of measures.
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•

Iowa identified about 12,000 assets. Few of the 12,000 assets are critical assets.
Out of the critical assets, 93% are not public owned.

•

Protective measures for the critical assets are monitored by homeland security
monitoring system, so they can be activated at the most appropriate threat level.

•

Iowa plans for critical asset protection has a multi-hazard approach. The plans
take into account natural hazards like fire, earthquakes, hurricanes, not just
terrorism.

•

Iowa State DOT is developing an interdependency model. No asset is isolated and
independent.

Contact: Larry Brennan (IT Department, Iowa DOT), A J Mumm (Iowa Emergency
Management Division)
2.5.2. Transportation Security Activities in Texas
Rummel et al. (2003) uses a two-step process to rank critical bridges across the State of
Texas. The first step is an automated ranking of all the bridges listed in the National
Bridge Inventory (NBI) for the state. This ranking is accomplished through the use a
Microsoft Access program using the Texas Bridge Criticality Formula given below.
TEXAS BRIDGE CRITICALITY FORMULA-The following equation represents Texas’
formula for ranking bridge criticality.
Criticality Index = {((Truck ADT x Truck ADT Factor / Max. Truck ADT) + (ADT x
ADT Factor / Max. ADT) + (Detour x ADT x Detour Factor / Max. Detour x Max.
ADT) + (Intersect Rt. ADT x Intersect Rt. Factor / Max. Intersect Rt. ADT) +
(Interstate Intersection x Interstate Intersection Factor) + (Navigation Importance x
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Navigation Factor) + (International Importance x International Factor) + (Military
Importance x Military Factor)) / 8} x Replacement Factor

(2.6)

The formula accounts for several criteria that are measured using data available from the
National Bridge Inspection database that can be downloaded to the Access program. The
criteria incorporated into the formula were those items TxDOT considered important,
based, in part, upon the responses to an AASHTO/TRB Task Force survey that helped
define and prioritize these criteria. The criteria included the economic impact due to
disruption of commerce by using the international factor, truck AADT, detour, etc.
General passenger transportation needs and risks to public safety were also considered.
The quantitative analysis of these factors can be obtained from the paper. This
methodology is less subjective. However, it is specific to one type of assets, namely,
bridges.
2.5.3. TMSARM Vulnerability Self Assessment Tool
The Transportation Security Agency (TSA) self-assessment tool guides a user through a
series of security-related questions in order to develop a comprehensive security baseline
of a transportation entity. The user is then prompted to assess the baseline security
system effectiveness in response to specific threat scenarios. The effectiveness is then reassessed based upon the addition of countermeasures in response to conditions of
heightened threat. This tool has restricted access and is available only to certain
companies and agencies. TSA intends to develop TSARM modules specific to
transportation modes. TSA currently has deployed a self-assessment module in support
of targets such as maritime vessel and facility categories and is planning to extend it to
other modes of transportation.

29

2.5.4. Blue Ribbon Panel Approach for Bridge VA
In order to provide guidance to bridge owners, the Federal Highway Administrator
appointed members to the Blue Ribbon Panel (BRP, 2003) on bridge and tunnel security.
The panel's objective was to apply its collective experience and knowledge about
structural design, structural integrity, and environmental stress and strain to new ways of
examining how critical bridges and tunnels can be protected against potential terrorist
attacks
The large number of bridges (600,000) and tunnels (500) in the US requires a two-tiered
approach: prioritization and risk assessment. The first tier, prioritization, is typically most
efficiently done in two steps. The first step is a data-driven approach, such as that used by
the Texas Department of Transportation (Rummel et al., 2003), for ranking bridges using
common criteria. The National Bridge Inventory (NBI) provides much of the data needed
for this step. In the second step of prioritization, additional data comes from owners and
operators familiar with specific characteristics of the facilities and the services they
provide. In this first tier ranking, prioritization of bridges and tunnels is based on
characteristics such as the following:
•

Potential for mass casualty based on Average Daily Traffic (ADT) and associated
peak occupancies

•

Criticality to emergency evacuation and response to emergencies

•

Military or defense mobilization

•

Alternative routes with adequate available capacity
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•

Potential for extensive media exposure and public reaction; symbolic value (to
what extent does the facility represent ideals and values that are important to the
American public, also visual symbolism, e.g., "signature bridges")

•

Mixed-use bridges and tunnels where highway and rail are co-located

•

Potential for collateral damage (land, marine, rail), including collateral property
and utilities

•

Maximum single span length as it relates to the time required to replace the
facility

•

Commercial vehicle vs. passenger vehicle mix and volume as a surrogate for
economic impact

•

Bridge or tunnel dimensions (as a surrogate for replacement time/cost)

•

Significance of revenue streams (e.g., tolls, fares) associated with the facility

•

Bridges and tunnels at international border crossings

The second tier is a risk assessment of high priority bridges taken from the first tier
(prioritization) to determine vulnerabilities and evaluate countermeasures to deter attack
and/or mitigate damages. The risk, R, to the facility is determined following an approach
similar to that developed for seismic retrofit and can be expressed as follows:
R=OxVxI

where,
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(2.7)

O = Occurrence: This factor is hazard oriented and will change with the nature of the
hazard. In the context of the report, the occurrence factor approximates the likelihood that
terrorists will attack the asset. It includes target attractiveness (from the perspective of the
threat), level of security, access to the site, publicity if attacked, and the number of prior
threats. Input into this factor typically comes from the law enforcement and intelligence
communities’ familiar with threat and operational security measures.
V = Vulnerability: Vulnerability is an indication of how much the facility or population
would be damaged or destroyed based on the structural response to a particular hazard. In
the context of the report, vulnerability is the likely damage resulting from various
terrorist threats (weapon type and location). It is a measure of expected damage, outcome
of the event, expected casualties, and loss of use, all features of the facility itself. Input
for this factor typically comes from engineering analysis and expertise.
I = Importance: Importance is a characteristic of the facility, not the hazard. Importance
is an indication of consequences to the region or nation in the event the facility is
destroyed or unavailable. Is the facility on an evacuation or military mobilization route; is
it likely to be used by first responders to emergencies; what is its historic and associated
significance; what is its peak occupancy? Input for this factor typically comes from
owners, operators, users, and beneficiaries of the facilities, often governmental sources,
and will use factors similar to those used in the first tier prioritization.

32

The formula for R properly expresses the interaction among the three factors. Dominant
factors magnify risk; negligible factors diminish it. Other formulas, such as models that
add the factors, fail to account for their interactive effects. For example, in the absence of
a threat ('O'=Ø), the risk should be zero as this model provides; additive models would
have a residual risk. In the multiplicative model, eliminating any one factor to zero (or
near zero) reduces the risk to near zero (e.g., low importance leads to low risk regardless
of other factors).

2.5.5. Sandia National Lab Community Vulnerability Assessment Methodology (VAM)
This methodology was developed as a prototype for the Chemical Facility Vulnerability
Assessment Project and lays the foundation for a computer-based vulnerability
assessment tool. Sandia National Laboratories has a Dams Security Assessment
Methodology, Water Supply and Treatment VAM, Vulnerability Analyses and Security
Design Reviews for Correctional Facilities, as well as the VAM-CF. This methodology is
applicable to all mission/sector categories, in addition to Education, Recreation Venues
(parks, museums, tourist attractions, etc.), Emergency Facilities, Foreign-represented
Governments (Embassies, residences, businesses, etc.), and special categories, such as
abortion clinics and religious facilities.
2.6. Multi Criteria Decision Methods
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) is a procedure aimed at supporting decision
maker(s) whose problem involves numerous and perhaps conflicting interpretations.
(Figueria, 2005). A multi-criteria decision problem generally involves choosing one of a
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number of alternatives based on how well those alternatives rate against a chosen set of
criteria. The criteria themselves are weighted in terms of importance to the decision
maker, and the overall “score” of an alternative is the weighted sum of its rating against
each criteria. The ordering of the alternatives by the decision scores is taken as the
ranking of the alternatives based on the participant’s input. MCDA aims at highlighting
the conflicts in the decision process between people and deriving a way to come to a
compromise in a transparent process. When MCDA involves a certain element of
subjectivity, the values of the researcher implementing MCDA play a significant part in
the validity of the outcome of the MCDA process. The most appropriate MCDA method
depends on the problem at hand and may to some extent depend on which model the
decision maker is most comfortable with. The intent of MCDM (Multi Criteria Decision
Methods) is to improve the quality of the decisions involving multiple criteria by making
choices more explicit, rational, and efficient.
MCDM has six functions that support this goal (Hobbs, 2000):
1. To structure the decision process.
2.

To show trade-offs among criteria.

3.

To help people reflect upon, articulate, and apply vague judgments concerning
acceptable trade-offs, resulting in recommendations concerning alternatives
(Stewart, 1992).

4. To help people make more consistent and rational evaluations of risk and
uncertainty.
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5.

To facilitate negotiation between the stakeholders. Giving a mathematical
structure to a subjective problem will help in corroborating the claim during
negotiations.

6. To document how decisions are made.
There are three steps in utilizing any decision-making technique involving numerical
analysis of alternatives:
1. Determine relevant criteria and alternatives.
2. Attach numerical measures to the relative importance of the criteria and to the
impacts of alternatives on these criteria.
3. Process the numerical values to determine a ranking of each alternative.
The following are some MCDM models for obtaining weights and ranking alternatives:
2.6.1. The WSM Method
The Weighted Sum Model (WSM) is probably the most commonly used
approach, especially for single-dimension problems. If there are m alternatives and n
criteria, then the best alternative is the one that satisfies (in the maximization case) the
following expression.(Fishburn,1967)

n

A *WSM − Score = m a x ∑ aij w j ,
i

j =1
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for i =1, 2, 3,..., m

(2.8)

where A* WSM -Score is the WSM score of the best alternative, n is the number of decision
criteria, is the value of the i-th alternative in terms of the j-th criterion, and wj is the
weight of j-th criterion.
This model is based on the additive utility assumption (Fishburn, 1967), which says that
the total value of each alternative is equal to the sum of the product given in the Equation
2.8.
2.6.2. The WPM Method
The Weighted Product Model (WPM) is similar to WSM. The main difference is that,
instead of adding the values and the weights as in WSM, the ratios of the values (aij) are
multiplied. Each alternative is compared with the others by multiplying a number of
ratios, one for each criterion. Each ratio is raised to the power equivalent to the relative
weight of the respective criterion. (Miller, 1969) In order to compare two alternatives, Ak
and Al, the following product has to be calculated:

n

R(Ak /Al) =

C (a

kj

/ alj )

wj

(2.9)

j =1

where n is the number of criteria, aij is the value of the i-th alternative in terms of the j-th
criterion, and wj is the weight of the importance of the j-th criterion.
If the term R(Ak /Al) is greater than or equal to one, then it indicates that alternative Ak is
more desirable than alternative Al. The best alternative is the one that is better than or at
least equal to all alternatives. The advantage of this method is it can be applied
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independently of the units of measure, because the method uses ratios instead of actual
values.
2.6.3. The AHP Method
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) decomposes a complex MCDM problem into a
system of hierarchies. AHP is used to estimate the weights for the different factors
effecting vulnerability and criticality in this research. (Saaty, 2000). The application of
the AHP approach explicitly recognizes and incorporates the knowledge and expertise of
the participants in the priority setting process by making use of their subjective
judgments. The importance of AHP, its variants, and the use of pairwise comparisons in
decision making is best illustrated in Saaty (2000). The use of AHP is discussed in
Chapter 3. The final step in the AHP deals with the structure of an m X n matrix, where
m is the number of alternatives and n is the number of criteria. The matrix is constructed
by using the relative importances of alternatives in terms of each criterion. The vector
(ai1, ai2, ai3,..., ain) for each i is the principal eigenvector of an n X n reciprocal matrix that
is determined by pairwise comparisons of the impact of m alternatives on the i-th
criterion. The process is shown in Chapter 3. Once the aij’s for each alternative with
respect to each criteria are obtained in the m X n matrix, the best alternative is indicated
by Equation 2.10.

n

A * AHP − Score = m a x ∑ a ij w j , for i = 1, 2, 3,..., m
i

j =1
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(2.10)

This step of AHP is similar to the WSM method (Section 2.6.1), the difference being
AHP uses relative values instead of absolute ones. AHP can be used in a single- or multidimensional decision making processes.
2.6.4. The ELECTRE Method
The ELECTRE method (for Elimination and Choice Translating Reality) (Triantaphyllou,
2000) deals with “outranking relations” by using pairwise comparisons among
alternatives under each one of the criteria separately. The outranking relationship of two
alternatives Ai and Aj, denoted as Ai Æ Aj, describes that even when the i-th alternative
does not dominate the j-th alternative quantitative, then the decision maker may still take
the risk of regarding Ai as almost surely better than Aj. The ELECTRE method has had
limited acceptance by the scientific and practitioner communities. Alternatives are said to
be dominated if another alternative is better than they are in terms of one or more criteria
and equal in the remaining criteria.
Two important concepts underscore the ELECTRE approach: thresholds and
outranking. (Triantaphyllou, 2000) Assume that there exist defined criteria, g(j),
j=1,2,…,r and a set of alternatives, A. Traditional preference modeling assumes the
following three relations hold for two alternatives (a, b) Є A:
aPb (a is preferred to b), g(a) > g(b)
aIb (a is indifferent to b), g(a) = g(b)
aJb (a cannot be compared to b)
If, for example, you have two cups of tea - one has 10 mg of sugar and the other has 11
mg of sugar - could you tell the difference? Traditional preference modeling says that,
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because the amount of sugar is not equal, then one will be preferred over the other. In
contrast to the traditional approach, ELECTRE introduces the concept of indifference
threshold, q, and the preference relationships are redefined as follows:
aPb (a is preferred to b) g(a) > g(b) + q
aIb (a is indifferent to b) |g(a) - g(b)| ≤ q, and
aJb (a cannot be compared to b) remains.
The ELECTRE method begins with pairwise comparisons of alternatives under each
criterion. The indifference threshold varies with the decision maker and cannot be clearly
specified. There is a point at which the decision maker changes from indifference to strict
preference, although this point may not always be clearly defined. The set of binary or
pairwise relations of alternatives are called outranking relations. Through the consecutive
assessments of outranking relations of the alternatives, the ELECTRE method elicits the
concordance index, defined as the amount of evidence to support the conclusion that one
alternative outranks or dominates another alternative. The discordance index is the
counterpart of the concordance index. This method is convenient when a large number of
alternatives are involved and a few criteria.
2.6.5. Resolving Conflicts
Few of the MCDM methods yield completely consistent results. If more than one MCDA
method is used for an application, different methods generally lead to diverse results.
(Hobbs, 2000) Different participants arrive at different results. Also, a participant
applying the method at different times may come up with dissimilar results. One of the
ways to resolve this issue is to expose members of the group to each other’s views. Often,
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a search for consensus will establish at least some common ground. Areas of agreement
and disagreement need to be identified by comparing rank orders chosen by different
people. (Hobbs, 2000) Are there any options that are ranked in the top three by every
person? Are there alternatives that are not ranked first, second, or third by any person? If
there is little consensus, then the problem can be broken down to two or more
perspectives and dealt with separately. The successive elimination method could be used
to delete options that are not found best under any set of weights between those
alternatives selected by the participants. Hamalainen et al. (1999) suggest that cluster
analysis or factor analysis could be used to define a few distinct set of weights or rank
orders of options that summarize the positions of various experts. For MCDM methods to
be useful, the group must have sufficient time and clear, consistent perspectives about the
problem to provide thoughtful responses.
2.7. Fuzzy Logic
Zadeh (1965) proposed fuzzy set theory as the means for quantifying the inherent
fuzziness that is present in ill-posed problems, which are a majority of real-life problems.
Fuzziness is found in many of our decisions, in the way we process information, and,
particularly in our thinking. Fuzziness stems from different perceptions or interpretations
we give to such phases as “later” and “high temperature”. Fuzzy logic is used when either
the data or the background knowledge of the data is riddled with vague concepts and
judgmental rules. (Triantaphyllou, 2000) The most critical step in the application of
fuzzy set theory is to effectively estimate the pertinent data or the membership function.
If x is the number of vehicles in a queue, “small” may be considered as a particular value
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of the fuzzy variable “queue”, and each x is assigned a number in the range from zero to
infinity, µsmall (x) Є (0, α), that indicates the extent to which that x is considered to be
small; µsmall (x) Є (0,α) is called a membership function. In fuzzy logic, the values are not
crisp and the fuzziness of the values exhibits a distribution described by the membership
function. Consider min-max fuzzy logic. If we consider union or OR, the outcome is
equal to the input variable with the greatest value, max (x1, x2, x3,…, xn). If A = 0.5, B
= 0.7 and C = A OR B, then C = max (0.5, 0.7) = 0.7. In most fuzzy problems, the rules
are generated based on past experience. Because every step in the VA process involves
uncertainty, fuzzy logic could be used to incorporate the uncertainty and subjectivity into
the VA process.
2.8. Neural Networks
Neural networks, inspired by models of the human brain, have significant potential for
solving complex real-life problems. An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is an
information processing paradigm that is inspired by the way biological nervous systems,
such as the brain, process information. It is composed of a large number of highly
interconnected processing elements (neurones) working in unison to solve specific
problems. ANNs, like people, learn by example. An ANN is configured for a specific
application, such as pattern recognition or data classification, through a learning process.
(Stergiou, 1999) Neural networks, with their remarkable ability to derive meaning from
complicated or imprecise data, can be used to extract patterns and detect trends that are
too complex to be noticed by either humans or other computer techniques. A trained
neural network can be thought of as an "expert" in the category of information it has been
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given to analyse. This expert can then be used to provide projections, given new
situations of interest, and answer "what if" questions.
One of first projects of risk assessment that used neural networks is in the area of internal
audit called auditMASTERPLAN. (Burger, M. S., 1998) The purpose of the risk
assessment was to determine a hierarchical risk ranking for a population made up of 600
auditable units. The original risk model included nineteen risk variables, such as asset
liquidity, degree of computerization, and existence of internal control systems. Based on
audit experience, variables were assigned an attribute from 1 to 10 to represent the
institutional impact of the risk related to each variable. The first step in building a neural
network application to replicate the risk assessment results was to develop a data set for
the neural network to use in training itself. A database containing the nineteen attribute
values based on the relative ranking of the variable's characteristics and the results from
auditMASTERPLAN was built using a spreadsheet format. During the training process, a
large number of such examples are learned by the neural network model, which then
enables it to perform quite well on previously unseen problems. Three different
commercial neural network products were selected to test the feasibility of using neural
network tools for this purpose. Because VA is an iterative process, neural networks could
be used to train the system to make decisions about the vulnerability and criticality of the
assets. The system could be trained initially using the input from the experts.
2.9. Need for this Study
Many organizations and agencies have conducted risk, threat, and vulnerability
assessments to keep their systems safe and secure. Although there are numerous
commercial and government methodologies in use today, currently no single method has
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become standard for the vulnerability assessment at the statewide level. Most of these
methodologies are based on AASHTO guidelines, which capture the issues concerning
vulnerability, but have serious limitations in the nature of extensive data requirements.
Few of the well-developed quantitative methods are highly specific to a particular asset
type, in most cases, bridges. Because we are interested in the statewide system-level
assessment and the methodologies available so far pertain to the particular asset, there is
a need to develop a method to suit Indiana’s immediate needs. Our study tries to develop
a methodology that addresses the vulnerability issues while reducing the need to answer
cumbersome surveys for a particular asset. Once the top high priority assets in terms of
vulnerability and criticality are determined, AASHTO guidelines could be used to
conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessment of a particular asset.
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter presents the framework and method used for identifying critical assets that
are under the control of the Indiana Department of Transportation. For the purpose of the
study, a methodology based on AASHTO guidelines (AASHTO, 2003) was developed to
identify the critical assets. The primary purpose of this chapter is to establish a
methodology based on the state-of-the-art in order to address the issues specific to
Indiana.
3.1. Research Framework
As in the case of most methodologies developed so far for vulnerability assessment, this
research framework is done in five stages. The main objective is to develop a decision
making tool for INDOT to identify and evaluate the level of vulnerability of assets
susceptible to terrorist attacks. The five steps are:
1. Identify assets from the thousands of assets that are under INDOT’s control. To
reduce the numbers to manageable size, a filter needs to be applied to select those
assets that are critical. Each of INDOT’s seven districts selected their 25 most
critical assets. The resulting 175 assets were prioritized at the statewide level
in stage 4 of the assessment process, based on their vulnerability .
2. Establish vulnerability and criticality factors to identify and evaluate those assets
selected in step 1. This step is important, because the selection depends on the
criteria specified. Also, there is no standardization available for the set of criteria
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that will help in evaluating the vulnerability and criticality of an asset. No
literature, so far in this field has defined a set of criteria that can be used
universally for evaluating vulnerability of assets. All methods have their own
definitions for vulnerability and criticality and assess assets based on those
definitions.
3. Develop a survey that will enable the experts to evaluate the assets electronically.
4. Assess the vulnerability and criticality of the assets, based on the criteria
identified in stage 2 of the process. Using the graphs and the vulnerabilitycriticality index, prioritize the list of assets.
5. Suggest a method to conduct in-depth vulnerability assessment, if necessary, of
the assets identified in stage 4 and suggest countermeasures suitable to these
assets. In this stage, the methodology suggested by AASHTO (AASHTO, 2002)
is used.
This research focused on these first five steps. The methodology can be written as a
logic diagram shown in Figure 4.
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Identify assets from preliminary survey

Weigh Criteria

Redo VA

Establish vulnerability and criticality factors

Assess vulnerabilities

Suggest countermeaures

Figure 4 Research Framework
Fuzzy logic could be used in each of the steps to deal with the subjective nature of the
input. Because vulnerability assessment is a continuous process, it needs to be redone
after every countermeasure implementation. This is represented by the loop in Figure 4.
Neural networks could be used to train the system to identify critical assets and assess the
vulnerabilities. Also, repeated vulnerability assessments can be conducted by
implementing neural networks.

3.2. Vulnerability Assessment
There is no standard definition for vulnerability assessment. Recently, efforts have been
made by the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) to promote a common
understanding of vulnerabilities. Because the NIAC definition s not yet universally
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accepted, given below are some of the more common definitions used for vulnerability
assessment.
•

Systematic examination of critical infrastructure, the interconnected systems on
which it relies, its information, or product, to determine the adequacy of security
measures, identify security deficiencies, evaluate security alternatives, and verify
the adequacy of such measures after implementation. (CIAO, 2004)

•

Systematic examination of an asset or product to determine the adequacy of
security measures, identify security deficiencies, provide data from which to
predict the effectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm the adequacy
of such measures after implementation. (Primode, 2004)

•

Vulnerability is defined as a set of conditions that may lead to an implicit or
explicit failure of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information
system. (NIAC, 2004)
3.2.1. Vulnerability and Criticality Index

In order to assess and evaluate assets, there needs to be common criterion for evaluating
relative vulnerability and criticality of assets. The assets considered in this research are of
varied nature, such as bridges, routes, equipment and personnel. In order to compare
them, it is necessary to identify a common measurable factor. Because none of the
characteristics of these assets are universal to all assets, we devised an index that
transforms the specific characteristics and the capability of an asset to respond to terrorist
attack into a quantifiable form. This index called the Vulnerability and Criticality Index,
is based on a set of criteria that are portable to evaluate different asset types. Some of the
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factors considered are importance of an asset to the community and the economy, number
of lives lost or affected and recoverability time. The criteria values are subjective in
nature. For purposes of implementation, the factors mentioned in the AASHTO
guidelines and the ones mentioned in this section that influence vulnerability and
criticality are captured in the definitions mentioned in Section 3.4.1. Because of the
subjective nature of the problem, the evaluation of assets is based on professional
judgment and previous experience.
The Vulnerability and Criticality Index reflects both how critical and how vulnerable an
asset is. Because each of the criteria considered does not influence vulnerability and
criticality to the same extent, they have different weights. The weights are obtained using
the Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP), which will be explained later in this chapter.
Experts provide the input for these weights, relying on their prior experience and
knowledge.
3.2.2. Vulnerability and Criticality Index Formulation
The assets in each district will be named as A1, A2, A3, …, Am where m is the m is the
maximum number of assets in each district. In our case study, m = 25. The notation for
175 assets from 7 districts is as follows. The asset names start with the first letter of the
district. For example, Greenfield assets are denoted from G1 to G25.
There are six criteria to evaluate the criticality and vulnerability of an asset, such as
importance and susceptibility to a threat, denoted as D1, D2, D3,…, D6.
The vulnerability and criticality values for each asset j in District i are denoted as Vij and
Cij, where j= 1, 2, 3,…, 25, i Є{G,V,S,T,L,C,F}, and
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G = Greenfield, V = Vincennes, S = Seymour, T = Toll Road, L = LaPorte , C =
Crawfordsville and F = Fort Wayne.

3.3. Data Collection
In order to put together a list of critical and vulnerable assets and to assess their
vulnerabilities, data were collected at various stages of the project.

3.3.1. Identification of Assets -- Preliminary Survey
Because the total number of assets that could be protected is overwhelming, a method
needs to be devised to narrow down the set of assets to the most critical and vulnerable
ones. The purpose is to consider all assets and identify those that are critical by
considering how critical each transportation asset is to the function and mission of the
activities it supports. For the purpose of identifying the assets, a preliminary survey was
conducted.

Representatives from each of INDOT’s seven districts (6 geographic

districts and the Indiana Toll Road) were asked to identify the 25 assets that they
consider to be most critical within their jurisdiction. The idea was that the people local
to the assets would have the best knowledge about the assets. This method was selected
also because the criteria that affect criticality were mostly subjective and not measurable.
The survey was intentionally kept open ended so as not to influence the expert’s
judgment as to the nature and the type of the critical assets. The people in the district
would know best what assets are critical. Responses to this survey were varied. Because
of the open-endedness, there were differences in the type of assets identified. Some
districts considered certain highway corridors important and some highlighted bridges.
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Other districts considered their equipment, facilities, or personnel to be their most
important assets. This indicates that an assessment vulnerability and criticality of assets
is highly subjective and is dependent on the perspective of the experts queried.
Problems arise at this stage because an expert must assume the nature of the threat
while choosing a critical asset. The vulnerability or criticality of an asset might vary
depending on the characteristics of the asset and its response to a particular type of
threat. For example, a bridge is not the likely target of a biological attack. Experts
should be instructed to consider the most likely type of an attack against an asset when
assigning the vulnerability and criticality of that asset. Identifying assets according to
the asset types such as bridges, routes and facilities and assessing the assets for
criticality and vulnerability within these asset types is recommended. Evaluating the
assets within asset types makes it easier to compare assets.
3.4. Development of District Survey
The results from the preliminary survey were collected and analyzed. The results
included a wide variety of assets -- bridges, corridors, US and state routes, unit sites,
Traffic Management Center, headquarters, personnel, etc. Because of the highly varied
nature of the top 25 assets in each district, designing a set of common quantifiable criteria
to assess vulnerability was not feasible. Two strategies were considered.
1. Develop a method that uses different measurable attributes based on the characteristics
of the asset and use them as factors indicating vulnerability and criticality. There are two
important limitations to this method. (A) The attributes are not consistent among all the
asset categories. This limitation makes the comparison of various assets difficult because
of a lack of common factor for evaluation. (B) The second limitation is, apart from
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bridges and routes, other kinds of assets do not have clear measurable attributes that
reflect their vulnerability.
2. Use a subjective approach. Because of the limitations of the first methodology, we
decided to take a more subjective approach and use expert knowledge in assessing the
vulnerability of the critical assets (AASHTO, 2003). This approach is widely used in
situations where statewide analysis needs to be conducted considering various asset
categories. The idea was to develop a method that is concise and requires minimum input
from experts while fully incorporating the factors that define vulnerability. The trade-off
was consider a few assets and conduct an extensive assessment based on AASHTO
guidelines or consider a larger set of assets using a moderate depth of analysis. Because
this is the preliminary attempt at VA for INDOT, we decided to analyze all 175 assets (25
from each of the 7 districts) before prioritizing them. In the next stage of data collection,
surveys were sent to the districts, asking them to evaluate the identified assets based on
the definitions of vulnerability and criticality. These definitions were a result of putting
together various criteria from different sources and methods mentioned in Chapter 2.
Owing to the subjective nature of the survey, providing careful definition of these terms
was very critical. Visual Basic and Macros in Excel were used to develop an online
survey with graphic interface. The survey sent to the districts looks as shown in Figures 5
to 7. The definition interface gives the user the definitions of Vulnerability and criticality
before the expert begins to input values. The expert is asked to enter the values for each
of the assets for their specific district, as shown in Figure 7. These values, once saved,
can be retrieved from the Excel sheet.
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Figure 5 Introductory User Interface

Figure 6 The Definition User Interface
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Figure 7 Expert Information Input User Interface

3.4.1. Determination of Vulnerability and criticality Definitions

Because there is no standard definition of vulnerability and criticality, we devised a
definition to suit our research needs. According to AASHTO guidelines (AASHTO,
2003), vulnerability and criticality are evaluated based on a survey of about 20 questions.
This process is feasible in a case in which the number of assets to be evaluated is few.
Because we had 175 assets to evaluate, we had to devise a method that captures the main
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factors that affect vulnerability and criticality. The method should also require minimum
data input for each asset from the experts because of the constraints on their time. Such a
procedure would be especially helpful if a larger number of assets were being considered
in a vulnerability assessment. The objective was to devise a set of criteria that provide a
common basis to measure the vulnerability and criticality of an asset. The factors that
affect vulnerability and criticality were identified and definitions were devised based on
these factors. Using the vulnerability and criticality definitions, the assets are evaluated to
obtain an index that reflects the assets’ vulnerability and criticality based on the criteria
defined.
Vulnerability of an asset (Vij)
We define the vulnerability of an asset as
1. The ease with which a person can get close enough to the asset to destroy/disable it.
2. An asset's design, implementation, or operation that renders the asset susceptible to
destruction or incapacitation by a threat.
3. The existence of materials at the site that expose human life, property, and resources to
damage from the results of a terrorist attack.
4. The symbolic importance of the asset to the community.
Criticality of an asset (Cij)
We define the criticality of an asset as
1. How essential the physical or cyber-based system is to the minimum operations of the
economy and government.
2. How severe an impact on security, public health and safety would the incapacitation or
destruction of those systems and assets?
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3. The availability of an alternative or substitute/replacement, for example, a detour in
the case of a disrupted route.
4. The time needed to restore the facility to its normal function.
By applying these definitions to an asset, the values for vulnerability and criticality are
obtained. These values are combined using the weights obtained from an AHP Survey to
obtain an index on a scale of 1 to 50. Based on the value of the index, the assets are
ranked and the most critical and vulnerable ones are strengthened by implementing
suitable countermeasures. Implementing countermeasures may reduce an asset’s
vulnerability, so that its index drops. Vulnerability assessment is a continuous process.
Implementation of countermeasures can reduce the vulnerability of highly vulnerable
assets. The strengthening of an asset and increased security will result in the reduction of
vulnerability, and the asset may drop down on the list of prioritized assets.
3.4.2. District Survey Data Collection
A survey containing the assets identified in the preliminary survey was sent to the seven
districts. Each survey had assets specific to its district. From the responses, the
Vulnerability and criticality values for each asset were obtained. The values from this
survey were used to obtain Vulnerability and Criticality Indices. Plotting these on a
vulnerability and criticality matrix (shown in Figure 8 ) would help us prioritize those
assets that fall in the upper right hand quadrant. A more extensive vulnerability
assessment could be conducted for assets that had the highest preliminary rank before
suitable countermeasures are suggested and implemented. The survey results from this
assessment can be combined using the AHP weights to obtain an over-all index. This
index will help in ranking the assets and in guiding resource deployment. The weights
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were obtained from the knowledge of experts using the Analytical Hierarchical Process
(AHP). AHP will be described in the following section.

Figure 8 Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix (AASHTO, 2002)

3.5. Obtaining the Weights Using AHP
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a mathematical technique for multicriteria
decision making. The pertinent data are derived by using a set of pairwise comparisons.
These comparisons are used to obtain the weights that represent the importance of the
decision criteria, and the relative performance measures of the alternatives in terms of
each individual decision criterion. The analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is a
comprehensive, logical and structural framework that allows improving the
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understanding of complex decisions by decomposing the problem into a hierarchical
structure. (Saaty, 1980). The incorporation of all relevant decision criteria, and their
pairwise comparison allows the decision maker to determine the trade-offs among
objectives. It enables people to make decisions involving many kinds of concerns,
including planning, setting priorities, selecting the best among a number of alternatives,
and allocating resources. The application of the AHP approach explicitly recognizes and
incorporates the knowledge and expertise of the participants in the priority setting process,
by making use of their subjective judgments. This is a particularly important feature for
decisions that must be made without precisely measurable information.
The AHP is based on three principles:
1. Decomposition of the decision problem,
2. Comparative judgment of the elements, and
3. Synthesis of the priorities.
3.5.1. Decomposition of the problem into hierarchy
The first step is to structure the decision problem in a hierarchy as depicted in Figure 9.
The goal of the decision, such as "Identifying the vulnerability and criticality of assets",
is at the top level of the hierarchy. The next level consists of the criteria relevant for this
goal. At the bottom level are the alternatives (in our case, various assets or asset
categories) to be evaluated. The asset categories considered are routes, equipment,
personnel, etc. Individual assets could also be considered as alternatives. For example,
route 1, route 2, etc. The purpose of the AHP is to compare the alternative at the third
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level of Figure 9 using the criteria at second level. Because the number of assets in our
case is large (175), it was not practical to use AHP to evaluate alternatives at stage 3.
Stage 3 would have required experts to create a matrix of order 175 for each of the 5
criteria. Because of its tedious nature, we used AHP only until step 2, where relative
importance of criteria is evaluated. The weights for different criteria are obtained by
pairwise comparison of the criteria at step 2. These weights help in the extensive
vulnerability assessment. The three steps for the example are shown in Figure 10.

Figure 9 The AHP Hierarchical Process

VA

Susceptibility

Importance

Asset 11
Asset

Recoverabilityty
Recoverabili

Asset 2

Accessibilityy
Accessibilit

Asset 3

Figure 10 Illustration of AHP
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Visibility

…

No of Ppl

Asset n

The criteria considered for INDOT assets are
1. Importance:
•

How important is this asset to the normal functions of society?

•

Would the loss of this asset cause severe economic impacts?

•

Would an attack on this asset cause substantial psychological fear among people?

2. Recoverability
•

Existence of alternative assets to maintain customary operations

•

Time to return the asset to regular condition

3. Number of people using the facility and personnel (Personnel Safety)
•

Number of INDOT personnel normally present at the site

•

Number of other people normally at the facility

•

Does the asset or site attract crowds for special events or on a regular basis?

4. Accessibility
•

Is there a fence around the asset?

•

Is access to the asset regulated by pass or guard personnel?

•

How close to the asset can unauthorized vehicles get?

5. Visibility
•

How visible is the asset as a potential target?

•

How aware are people of the target's existence?

6. Susceptibility to threat: Consider explosive, chemical, biological, radiological weapons,
as well as hazardous materials or other dangerous items.
•

How vulnerable is the asset to such threats?
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•

Is there a system to control access to such weapons and materials at the site?

•

Can any products stored or used on your site be used as, or in the manufacture of,
a mass casualty weapon, or cause extensive environmental damage?

AHP can be used to evaluate the vulnerability of assets, if the assets are considered as
alternatives in step 3 of the hierarchy. The alternatives could be
1. Asset categories such as bridges, routes, equipment and personnel
2. Assets within the same category such as bridge 1, bridge 2, …
3. Individual assets from different categories such as bridge 1, route 2, equipment
3, …
For the sake of illustration, we chose asset types as our alternatives. In the research, AHP
was used only until stage 2 where criteria are compared. The following are the asset
categories considered for the purpose of assessing their vulnerabilities based on the
criteria mentioned above. The categories are the result of grouping the “top 25” responses
received from seven districts to our survey.
The asset categories considered are
1. Route sections with bridges
2. Route sections without bridges
3. Traffic Management Center
4. Central and district offices
5. Communication systems
6. Equipment
7. Personnel
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3.5.2. Comparative Judgment of Elements
The second step in the AHP process is the comparison of the alternatives and the criteria.
The asset categories are compared in pairs with respect to each element of the next higher
level. For example, all the assets (alternatives) are pairwise compared with respect to
criterion ‘importance’ as shown in Table 5. For this comparison, the fundamental scale of
Table 3 can be used. It allows the analyst to express the comparisons in verbal terms,
which are then translated to the corresponding numbers.
Table 3 Fundamental Scale for Pairwise Comparisons
Comparative

Definition

Explanation

Importance
1

Equally important

Two decision elements (e.g., indicators)
equally influence the parent decision
element.*

3

5

Moderately more

One decision element is moderately more

important

influential than the other.

Strongly more important

One decision element has stronger influence
than the other.

7

9

2, 4, 6, 8

Reciprocals

Very strongly more

One decision element has significantly more

important

influence over the other.

Extremely more

The difference between influences of the two

important

decision elements is extremely significant.

Intermediate judgment

Judgment values between equally, moderately,

values

strongly, very strongly, and extremely.
If v is the judgment value when i is compared
to j, then 1/v is the judgment value when j is
compared to i.

* Parent decision element is the goal or the main objective in the hierarchy process. It is
the element at the top of the structure in Figure 9.
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3.5.3. Synthesis of Priorities
In step 3, the criteria are evaluated against each other by pairwise comparison. This
process helps identify the importance of criteria relative to each other. This is particularly
useful when the criteria that influence the criticality or vulnerability of an asset do not
have the same weights. For example, to determine the vulnerability of an asset, the
criterion ‘recoverability’ could have more weight than the criterion ‘visibility’ in
influencing vulnerability. In such a case, we need to identify how much each of the
factors contributes to the vulnerability of an asset. AHP process helps us determine those
weights. Sum of the weights for each of these criteria add up to 1.
To illustrate the AHP process, an example of pairwise comparisons is given below.
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Table 4. Pairwise Comparison of Criteria
Importance

Recoverability

No of ppl &
prsnl

Accessibiity

Visibiliy

SusceptibilityThreat

impactseconomic

Sum

Weights

Importance

1

0.5

0.5

3

4

0.333

2

11.33

0.155

Recoverability

2

1

0.5

2

3

1

3

12.50

0.171

No of ppl &
personnel

2

2

1

4

3

1

4

17.00

0.233

Accessibiity

0.33

0.5

0.25

1

2

0.25

0.5

4.83

0.066

Visibiliy

0.25

0.33

0.33

0.5

1

0.25

0.33

2.99

0.041

SusceptibilityThreat

3

1

1

4

4

1

3

17.00

0.233

Impacts

0.5

0.33

0.25

2

3

0.33

1

7.41

0.101

73.06
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Consider the shaded region in Table 4. The number in the first row, second column is
obtained as follows. The importance criteria are weighed against recoverability and, in
the analyst’s opinion, importance is not as significant as recoverability. It is halfway
between “equally important” and “moderately less” important. Hence, the value assigned
is 1/2. The upper triangular half of the matrix is filled in a similar way. The diagonal
elements are 1 because the criteria are evaluated against themselves. The lower triangular
matrix is obtained by inverting the entries in the upper triangular matrix. Mathematically,
they can be represented as aij = 1/aji . Once all the cells in the shaded area are filled, the
elements in each column for a row are added to obtain ‘sum’. The weights are obtained
for each criterion by normalizing the values under ‘sum’ so that the sum of the values for
‘weights’ adds up to one.
The next step in the AHP process is the comparative judgment of elements (alternatives),
which is pairwise comparison of assets with respect to each criterion. This step is
performed only if the entire vulnerability assessment is performed using AHP. In such a
case, the assets (alternatives) are evaluated by pairwise comparison. This is feasible if the
number of alternatives is not large. In the example, asset categories are considered as
alternatives. The asset categories are compared in the manner explained above, but with
respect to one criterion, in this case, Importance. Number 3 in the first row third column
is obtained when the “routes sections with bridges” asset category is weighed against
TMC with respect to importance. The matrix is filled similar to Table 5 by pairwise
comparing each asset against the other with the criterion ‘importance’ in mind. Because
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there are six alternatives, six matrices will be generated, one with respect to each criterion.
These tables give the weights of each of the asset categories against each criterion.
Table 5. Pairwise comparison of assets with respect to Importance
RS w
Bridges

RS w/o
Bridges

TMC

C and D
offices

communication
Systems

Equipment

Sum

Weights

Route Sections
w bridges

1

2

3

3

2

4

15

0.334

Route sections
w/o brdiges

0.5

1

0.5

2

1

2

7

0.156

TMC

0.33

2

1

2

1

2

8.33

0.185

Central and
District offices

0.33

0.5

0.5

1

1

2

5.33

0.119

Communicatio
n Systems

0.5

1

1

0.5

1

2

6

0.134

Equipment

0.25

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

1

3.25

0.072

44.91

In the synthesis step of the AHP process, we synthesize the comparisons to get the
priorities of the alternatives with respect to each criterion and the weights of each
criterion with respect to the goal. The elements in Table 6 are the outputs (local priorities
with respect to each criterion) of tables similar to Table 5. Relative weights for the
criteria are obtained from Table 4. The local priorities are then multiplied by the weights
of the respective criteria obtained in Table 4. The results are summed up to get the global
priority for each alternative.
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Table 6. Local Priorities for Alternatives

Importance
Weights
Route Sections w
Bridges
Route Sections
w/o Bridges
TMC
Central and
District Offices
Communication
Systems
Equipment

Recoverability

No of
ppl

Susceptibilitythreat

Global
Priority

Normalized
Global
Priority

Ranking

0.16

0.17

0.23

0.23

0.33

0.32

0.17

0.29

0.21

0.27

1

0.16

0.20

0.17

0.15

0.13

0.17

4

0.19

0.15

0.29

0.22

0.17

0.22

2

0.12

0.17

0.22

0.19

0.14

0.18

3

0.13

0.10

0.10

0.10

0.08

0.11

5

0.07

0.07

0.06

0.06

0.05

0.06

6

0.79

1.00
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The number in the first row under Global Priority is obtained by multiplying the row 1
(route sections with bridges) values by the corresponding numbers in the row weights
(the weights for each criteria obtained from Table 4.

Sample Calculation:
Global Priority for Route Sections with Bridges =
(0.33* 0.16) + (0.32 * 0.17) + (0.17*0.23) + (0.29 *0.23) = 0.21.

(3.1)

The values for Global Priority are normalized so that they sum up to one, as shown in the
column under Normalized Global Priority. Using these values, the asset categories are
ranked.
3.5.4. Justification for AHP
The principle assumption of AHP is that the weights of the criteria do not depend on the
alternatives under consideration. In cases where weights are not independent, AHP can be
combined with utility theory. Utility theory deals with the subjective probabilities. When
the preference of a particular alternative depends not just on the choice of the decision
maker but also on the state and nature of the alternatives that are beyond the control of
the decision maker, utility theory is used. AHP is simple to apply and is the most widely
used MCDM method when the criteria are subjective. (Triantaphyllou, 2000) AHP is less
biased when care is taken by the decision-makers to choose meaningful weights. Among
the MCDM methods, hierarchical rating is preferred, because experts find it easier and
more logical than direct weighting methods such as WSM (Hobbs, 2000).
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CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

This chapter presents the results obtained from the district survey and the analytical
hierarchical process of vulnerability assessment. The results from the district survey can
further be investigated for vulnerabilities using the AASHTO method. The values from
this method can be combined using the weights obtained through AHP. The purpose of
the model is to provide a tool for the agencies in Indiana to evaluate the vulnerability and
criticality of assets. This method can assist transportation agencies to prioritize any asset.
The important aspect of this method is the transferability and the simplicity of the
methodology. This is especially helpful when a large number of assets need to be filtered
to obtain a subset of assets that are critical and vulnerable. Also, the results are
interpreted and the limitations of the method are identified in this chapter.

4.1. Analysis of District Survey Results
Five districts out of seven responded to the district survey. Each of the 25 assets
in each district was evaluated for its vulnerability and criticality. This evaluation resulted
in two indices criticality index and a vulnerability index. The values for these indices
were obtained based on the criteria defining vulnerability and criticality. These indices
transform the subjective nature of the criteria into a numerical value. The results obtained
from the districts are plotted on the vulnerability and criticality matrix (Figure 8)
suggested by AASHTO (2002). In this method, the values for vulnerability (Vij) and
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criticality (Cij) are plotted against each other for each asset. The AASHTO method uses a
scale of 0 to 100. We used a scale of 0 to 50 to reduce the dispersion. We noticed that
there is a tendency for experts to assign values in multiples of 5 or 10, whether the scale
was 0 to 50 or 0 to 100. The assets that fall in Quadrant I are classified as highly critical
and vulnerable. An assumption that all assets that have both vulnerability and criticality
index greater than 25 (50% of 50) fall in Quadrant I was made. AASHTO (2002)
suggests that any asset that has 50% of the maximum value or greater can be classified as
a priority asset. The following figures (Figures 11 to 15) show the results and the plotted
matrices for the districts that responded.
.
Crawfordsville Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix
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Figure 11 Crawfordsville Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix
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There are fewer than 25 points in the matrices, because of the overlap of the points. Some
of the assets had identical vulnerability and criticality values. The points are not
identified by ID’s or names because of the sensitive nature of the information. Similarly
in other cases too, there is an overlap of points. For example, in the case of Fort Wayne,
as shown in Figure 12, 14 assets had the same criticality value of 45 and vulnerability
value of 50.

Fort Wayne Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix
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Figure 12 Fort Wayne Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix
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Greenfield Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix
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Figure 13 Greenfield Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix
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LaPorte Vulnerability -Criticality Matrix
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Figure 14 LaPorte Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix.
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Vincennes Criticality and Vulnerability Matrix
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Figure 15 Vincennes Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix
4.2. Discussion of Results
The plots for the districts tended to follow two patterns. For some districts, most of the
assets were clustered in Quadrant I; for other districts, the assets were distributed in all
quadrants. Assets that fall in Quadrant I of Figures 11 to 15 can be classified as critical
and vulnerable. If all assets in a district were being considered, one would expect only a
few assets to fall in the top right quadrant. In such a case, the assets that fall in Quadrant I
could be classified as most critical and immediate improvements could be considered.
Because the 25 assets being considered by each district had already been listed as the
most critical and vulnerable, it is reasonable to expect that most of the assets would fall in
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Quadrant I. In such a case, it is more difficult to distinguish the most critical and
vulnerable assets from the others.
The pattern observed in the Greenfield district appears to be the result of taking the 25
assets as the universe, and trying to distinguish among those 25 without considered the
other assets in the district that were not a part of the top 25.
This method may work better when all assets in the district are considered. In
such a case, there would be a clearer segregation between the assets that are critical and
vulnerable and the rest of the district assets. The results we obtained from the districts
could be also different due to the varied interpretations of the definitions of Vulnerability
and Criticality. An attempt to distinguish between the top 25 assets in an INDOT district
will probably lead to a much different plot based on a rating of all assets in the district.
However, this assessment of each district’s top 25 assets will help as preparation for the
statewide vulnerability assessment.
The discrepancies in the results from various districts could be reduced if the
experts are trained to think with the same perspective. Once the top 25 assets are
identified, the experts can be asked to rate these top 25 assets relative to each other
without considering the rest of the assets in the district.
4.3. Combining Vulnerability and Criticality Indices
Because the plotting of the indices did not give clear results, we attempted to combine the
values for the vulnerability and criticality indices to give vulnerability and criticality
index. Using this one number, we prioritized the assets which gave better results. In this
case, we assumed, vulnerability and criticality have the same weight. Table 7 shows an
example of this prioritization method. Some of the assets had the same value for the
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combined Vulnerability and Criticality Index. In such a case, the assets were given equal
priority. When choosing an asset for countermeasure implementation among equally
important assets, a more extensive vulnerability assessment as discussed in Section 4.5
can be used.
Table 7 Prioritization of Assets Using Vulnerability and Criticality Index
Assets

Criticality
Index (CGj)

Vulnerability
Index (VGj)

Vulnerability and
Criticality Index

Priority

Asset 24

50

50

100

1

Asset 25

50

50

100

1

Asset 23

45

50

95

3

Asset 22

40

50

90

4

Asset 13

35

45

80

5

Asset 14

35

45

80

5

Asset 15

35

45

80

5

Asset 16

35

45

80

5

Asset 17

35

45

80

5

Asset 18

35

45

80

5

Asset 19

40

40

80

5

Asset 20

40

40

80

5

Asset 21

40

40

80

5

Asset 10

30

45

75

14

Asset 11

30

45

75

14

Asset 12

30

45

75

14

Asset 6

30

40

70

17

Asset 7

30

40

70

17

Asset 8

30

40

70

17

Asset 9

30

40

70

17

Asset 2

20

45

65

21

Asset 3

25

40

65

21

Asset 4

25

40

65

21

Asset 5

25

40

65

21

Asset 1

20

40

60

25

75

4.4. Comparing Results from Different Districts
The results obtained from different districts need to be combined to get a statewide list of
priority assets. This is not straightforward, because the assets in each district are not
equally critical or vulnerable. For example, all the assets identified in the list from
District 1 could be more critical than the top asset in District 2. In such a case, the assets
in District 1 would need to be protected first before attending to District 2 assets. Figure
16 shows the Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix where the assets from all five districts
are plotted. The assets in each district are not spread out equally in all the quadrants. The
assets from District V are scattered in all quadrants while the assets in District C are
concentrated in Quadrant I.
Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix-All District List
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Figure 16 Vulnerability and Criticality Matrix – All District Plot
The variation in the pattern is probably because of a difference in the perception of the
experts while evaluating the assets. Some of them considered the top 25 assets as a
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separate group, and others considered all the assets in the district while assessing their top
25. We devised a few methods that might help in converting the various district lists into
a statewide list of critical and vulnerable assets.
1. Have a committee of experts consider the top 5 assets in each district and rank
them from 1 to 25. Using the ranks for the assets from each district, obtain a
weight for each district. This could be done by adding the ranks for the assets in
each of the districts and obtaining a sum. The inverse values of these sums can be
used as the weight for each district. The criticality and vulnerability index of each
of the assets can be multiplied by the respective district weight to obtain the
ranking for the entire set of assets. The limitation of this procedure is that if a
district has only one prominent asset and the rest are not so important, the weight
of the prominent assets carries over to the rest of the assets in the district.
2. Obtain a weight for each district using the judgment of a group of experts. Each
district weight would then be applied to all the 25 assets in the respective district.
For example district G might be given a weight of 1.2 and district V is given a
weight of 1.08. Then the assets G1 to G25 are multiplied by 1.2. To obtain G’1 to
G’25. Similarly, assets V’1 to V’25 are obtained by multiplying V1 to V25 by
1.08. Ranking a statewide list of assets is obtained by sorting the asset values such
as G’1,..., G’25 and V’1 to V’25. This procedure has the limitation of being
biased. Every asset in district G is not more important or less important than any
asset in district V to the same extent. The criticality and vulnerability of an asset
is not dependent only on which district the asset belongs to. There are other
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factors such as the environment, the existence of an alternative and usage that
affect the critical and vulnerable nature of an asset.
3. Obtain weights for each asset type using expert judgment. For example, say
“bridges” are 1.2 times more important than “facilities”. As an example, bridge 1
in a district = 1.2 X subdistrict building 1 in that district. Rank assets within asset
categories and use these weights to combine the all assets across the state. This
method has the limitation that all assets belonging to one asset type are not
equally more important or less important than other asset types. Also, an asset’s
criticality and vulnerability depends on many factors, such as location and usage,
not just the type of asset.
4. Assuming the assets are evaluated at the state level, a counter-terrorism
committee of individuals who have adequate knowledge about threats and are
familiar with assessment studies is convened. This committee will consider the
top assets in all districts and choose the most critical and vulnerable asset among
them. The chosen asset is selected for countermeasures and reassessed for its
subsequent vulnerability and criticality. Examples of countermeasures are
discussed in Chapter 5. Because of the asset’s reduced vulnerability, it may drop
down on the list of assets in that district. If the countermeasure selected does not
reduce the vulnerability level, choose a different countermeasure based on the
feasibility and the budget. The process of choosing an asset for countermeasure
implementation is performed again among the seven assets from seven districts.
This list will be similar to the earlier one with a possible change that the second
most important asset will be the top priority asset in that particular district where
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an asset was chosen in iteration 1 of this process. Depending on the available
resources and budget, agencies can pick one among seven assets in a similar
manner as described above for countermeasure implementation.
Experts at INDOT suggest that the best way to identify assets is by asset types, such as
bridges, routes and facilities. This classification by asset type is used in budgeting and
allocating resources. Once the assets are classified by type, the assets within each district
can be the ranked. A group of experts at the central office along with the experts from
each district can be convened together to help decide on the overall ranking at the state
level for the assets identified at the district level within each asset category.
4.5. Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment using AHP
Once the high priority assets are identified through two filters, an extensive vulnerability
assessment can be conducted. The comprehensive vulnerability assessment could also be
used if there are fewer assets to evaluate. The two filters help to identify the critical assets
first and then identify vulnerable assets among the selected critical assets. Table 8 shows
a survey based on AASHTO guidelines (AASHTO 2002). There are six criteria affecting
vulnerability and criticality.
1. Importance
2. Accessibility.
3. Recoverability
4. Susceptibility to threat
5. Visibility
6. Number of people affected.
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Each of the six criteria has various factors affecting it, as shown in Figure 10 and Table 8.
A default value is given for each factor. Each factor is applied to the asset under
consideration and, if applicable, gets its default value. Otherwise, the assigned value is
zero. Once all the values are determined, they are summed up for each of the criteria and
there would be six values, D1 through D6. The values D1 to D6 are normalized on a scale
of 1 to 10, so that values for all the criteria are on a same scale. The Vulnerability and
Criticality Index is obtained by calculating the weighted sum of the normalized values D1
through D6. The weights used (d1 to d6) are obtained using AHP. The Vulnerability and
Criticality Index =
(D1*d1) + (D2*d2) + (D3*d3) +(D4*d4) +(D5*d5) +(D6*d6).

(4.1)

The order of criteria in Table 8 is according to the weight of each criterion obtained using
AHP shown in Table 9. The criterion that has the highest weight (d1) is included first in
Table 8.
Table 8 Comprehensive Vulnerability Survey
Criteria

Recoverability
(D1)

Susceptibility
to threat (D2)

Factor

Default
value

Description

Replacement
cost
Down time

3

Emergency
Response
Function

5

Availability of
an alternative

4

Is this the only asset that can perform its
primary function?

Ability to Provide
Protection

1

Does the asset lack a system of measures
for protection? (i.e., Physical or response
force)

Will significant replacement cost be
incurred if the asset is attacked?
Will an attack on the asset cause significant
replacement/down time?
Does the asset serve an emergency
response function and will the action or
activity of emergency response be
affected?

3
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2

Is the asset relatively vulnerable to an
attack? (i.e., Due to location, prominence,
or other factors)

Receptor
Impacts

1-5

1 - No environmental or human receptor
effects
2- Acute or chronic toxic effects to
environmental receptor(s)
3- Acute and chronic effects to
environmental receptor(s)
4-Acute or chronic effects to human
receptor(s)
5- Acute and chronic effects to
environmental and human receptor(s)

Access
Proximity

1-5

1 Asset with no vehicle traffic and no
parking within 50 feet
2 Asset with no unauthorized vehicle traffic
and no parking within 50 feet
3 Asset with vehicle traffic but no vehicle
parking within 50 feet
4 Asset with vehicle traffic but no
unauthorized vehicle parking within 50 feet
5 Asset with open access for vehicle traffic
and parking within 50

Security Level

1-5

1Controlled and protected security access
with a response force available
2 Controlled and protected security access
without a response force
3 Controlled security access but not
protected 4 Protected but not controlled
security access
5 Unprotected and uncontrolled security
access

Government
Continuity

5

Is the asset necessary to maintain
government continuity?

Military
Importance

5

Is the asset important to military functions?

Economic Impact

5

Will damage to the asset have an effect on
the means of living, or the resources and
wealth of a region or state?

Functional
Importance

2

Is there an overall value of the asset
performing or staying operational?

Symbolic
Importance

1

Does the asset have symbolic importance?

Relative
Vulnerability to

attack

Accessibility
(D3 )

Importance
(D4)
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Casualty Risk

Number of
people
affected (D5)

Visibility
(D6)

5

Is there a possibility of serious injury or loss
of life resulting from an attack on the
asset?

Attendants/Users 1-5

1 Less than 10
2 10 to 100 (Major Incident per FEMA)
3 100 to 1000
4 1000 to 3000
5 Greater than 3000 (Catastrophic Incident
per FEMA)

Level of
recognition

1 Largely invisible in the community
2 Visible by the community
3 Visible Statewide
4 Visible Nationwide
5 Visible Worldwide

1-5

4.5.1. Determination of Criteria Weights Using AHP

The survey was sent to the members of the Study Advisory Committee and the
Prevention Subcommittee of INDOT-CTASC (Counter Terrorism and Security Task
Council). The experts used their knowledge to provide the input. The weights were
calculated for each of the six criteria. The values of the weights (d1 to d6) obtained from
the surveys are given in Table 9. In this research, AHP was used only until stage two to
compare the criteria and get weights, as shown in Figure 17. Stage 3 of AHP requires the
alternatives to be compared pairwise against each other. This is feasible only when there
are few alternatives, on the order of 2 to 9. Our study assessed 175 assets, each asset
being an alternative. Pairwise comparison of 175 assets would be tedious. The weights in
Table 9 indicate that the experts considered ‘recoverability’ and ‘susceptibility to threat’
as the most important criteria. This shows that the experts consider the functionality of
the asset above other criteria in evaluating vulnerability and criticality of an asset.
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Table 9 Weights of Criteria Obtained from AHP Survey
Criteria
Recoverability
Susceptibility to Threat
Accessibility
Importance
No of people affected
Visibility

Notation
d1
d2
d3
d4
d5
d6

Weights
0.308
0.215
0.159
0.143
0.111
0.065

VA

Susceptibility

Importance

Recoverability

Accessibility

Visibility

No of Ppl

Figure 17 AHP Framework used in the Research
Vulnerability and Criticality Index =
(0.308 *D1) + (0.215*D2) + (0.159 *D3) + (0.143 *D4) + (0.111* D5) + (0.065 * D6)

(4.2)

Using this index, the list of assets can be prioritized. This survey was not used in the
study. It is included here as a recommendation for INDOT for conducting future
vulnerability assessments. The reason for not using this survey in the study is because of
its extensive data needs. Each asset needs to be assessed for each of the six factors and
sub factors of the six criteria. Because one person at each district would be providing the
information regarding all the assets, we decided to use a simpler version of the survey.
The simpler version combines these factors into vulnerability and criticality. By
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incorporating the factors into the definitions of vulnerability and criticality, we were able
to assess the vulnerabilities of the assets. This procedure was described in Chapter 3.
4.6. Iterative Vulnerability Assessment and Neural Networks
Vulnerability assessment is a continuous process. Once the assets are identified,
evaluated, ranked and appropriate countermeasures are implemented, the security level of
that asset may go up and its vulnerability is reduced. This would cause the asset to drop
down on the list. Also, with time, the circumstances and the threat levels change, which
influence vulnerability and criticality. To incorporate such changes, vulnerability
assessment needs to be conducted on a regular basis. This is shown as a loop in Figure 4
in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDOT TO CONDUCT VA

5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the framework and recommendations for conducting Vulnerability
Assessment (VA) for the Department of Transportation in Indiana on a statewide as well
as at an asset level. The framework involves a set of guidelines and procedures that best
fit INDOT and will help it conduct VA. The framework includes forming a
multidisciplinary team, identifying assets on a statewide level, narrowing down the list to
a few important assets based on their vulnerability and criticality, conducting extensive
VA, identifying countermeasures, implementing them and redoing the vulnerability
assessment.
5.2 Multidisciplinary Team Composition
The success of vulnerability assessment depends greatly on the expertise and the varied
composition of the team members conducting the assessment. The formation of a
multidisciplinary team is essential in order to address various critical and vulnerable
components of an asset, knowledge about which is not usually available with one
individual. This approach suggests the formation of a dedicated, multidisciplinary team
with access to required resources, ranging from databases to personnel. In addition to the
formation of a team, commitment from senior State DOT officials to examine critical
assets carefully and identify cost-effective countermeasures is crucial. AASHTO (2002)
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suggests that the State DOT organize a multidisciplinary team whose members possess a
good knowledge of the department’s mission, critical assets, and policies, plans and
procedures. It is advised that the team members should represent departmental functions
such as:

•

Budget

•

Communications

•

Environmental management

•

Maintenance

•

Purchasing

•

Construction

•

Facilities management

•

Materials testing

•

Safety

•

Design of structures

•

Human resources

•

Planning

•

Traffic operations

In addition to the internal members, the team will require the services of members from
external sources such as law enforcement, fire services, public safety and emergency
management services. External members are essential, because a DOT does not have
personnel specifically trained to deal with terrorism issues.
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5.3 Resources and Data Needs

To address the issues and to ensure the team is well equipped to proceed with the
assessment procedures, training exercises should be held prior to vulnerability assessment.
USDOT and AASTO conduct Vulnerability Assessment and Emergency response
workshops from time to time. The following list identifies the types of resources that can
be tapped into by the team to conduct a highway vulnerability assessment.
•

Asset data could be obtained from
-National Bridge Inventory System
-Hazardous Materials Information System

•

Threat data such as “Is the threat credible?” Or “How grave is the threat?”
-Law Enforcement
-State’s Emergency Management Agency
-Homeland Security Office

•

Vulnerability data is obtained by conducting surveys of experts regarding factors
such as the ease of access and probability of attack.

•

Consequence data identifies the assets which, if attacked, produce the greatest
risks for undesirable outcomes. Consequences can impact human life or economic
activity.

•

Countermeasures data estimate delay to aggressors who seek to gain access by
using tools in a forced entry or protection of the asset from the effects of tools,
weapons, and explosives. For example, installing security systems with video
capability at all DOT facilities.

•

Cost data
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•

Policies, plans, and procedures

•

Personnel (interviews)

•

Geographic Information Systems (maps, drawings)

5.4 Critical Asset Identification
A process is necessary for prioritizing all assets with respect to their vulnerability
in terms of their criticality of the ability to deter, detect, delay, and defend against
terrorist attacks. The large number and varied nature of assets in the state lends itself to a
two-tiered approach: prioritization and vulnerability assessment. The first tier,
prioritization, is typically the first step where a few assets among many are identified.
This study suggested a prioritization methodology called the Vulnerability and Criticality
Index method that can be used efficiently to identify the first set of assets. This
prioritization methodology was discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, along with a case
study. We recommend giving clear instructions as to the nature and the type of the assets.
The experts need to be trained to think of the most likely attack on the asset before
assessing the criticality of an asset. Also, clear instructions should be given to consider
only the top 25 assets identified in the first stage to obtain consistency in the perception
and evaluation of assets. If some assets, after this assessment stage, are assigned a similar
vulnerability and criticality index, a more comprehensive vulnerability assessment
procedure, as suggested in Section 4.5, may be conducted.
From our study and the information gathered from other states, we recommend
the following set of assets be included in the preliminary assessment.
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•

Infrastructure such as bridges, interstate highways, US and state routes,
corridors and tunnels.

•

Facilities for storage, maintenance, headquarters, testing labs, ports of
entry, traffic operation centers, unit complexes, district offices, rest areas,
weigh stations, etc.

•

Equipment such as vehicles carrying hazardous materials and roadway
monitoring variable message signs.

•

Personnel including vendors and contractors.

Once the set of assets is identified, the next step is to evaluate the assets for their
vulnerability and criticality. This preliminary assessment can be done using the procedure
described in Chapter 3. Each asset is assessed for vulnerability and criticality separately,
based on the factors mentioned in the previous chapter. Those assets that are highly
critical and vulnerable are selected and an extensive VA assessment can be conducted
using AASHTO guidelines. This is comprehensive; it requires extensive knowledge of
the asset characteristics and is time consuming. It requires answering a set of questions
for critical asset factors and vulnerability assessment factors and noting if the factor is
relevant to the particular asset as shown in Table 10. In case a factor is applicable, it takes
a binary value of 1; otherwise zero. The total score for criticality is the sum of all the
applicable critical factor values for that asset. Similar analysis is done for Vulnerability
and a score is obtained.
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Table 10 Critical Asset Factors and Values

5.5 Threat Assessment
Assessing the threats to the assets is one of the components of vulnerability assessment.
This factor needs special consideration, because threats are dynamic and have uncertainty
associated with them. Furthermore, the information regarding the threats comes from a
source outside of INDOT. AASHTO (2002) states that The U.S. Department of Justice
(USDOJ) developed an approach for threat analysis as part of its “State Domestic
Preparedness Equipment Program.” Few states have adopted the threat analysis approach
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suggested by USDOT (AASHTO, 2002). Threat information could also be obtained from
the Homeland Security Advisory System, which provides a framework for assessing and
communicating the nature and degree of threats. It assesses whether the threat is
imminent and credible. The effective method is to consider factors such as existence,
history, intent and nature of target while conducting threat analysis.

5.6 Identification of Assets for Improvement
Once the vulnerability and criticality scores are obtained, they are plotted against each
other as shown in Figure 8. If this procedure does not give clear results as to the most
important assets, an alternate method is to use weights for vulnerability and criticality.
The weights are obtained using AHP and a Vulnerability and Criticality Index is
calculated (Refer to Section 4.5). Using the Vulnerability and Criticality Index, the assets
are sorted and ranked. This method was explained in Chapters 3 and 4. The top ranked
assets are chosen for immediate improvements. Suitable countermeasures are suggested
and implemented. This may reduce the vulnerability of the asset.
5.7 Recommended Countermeasures
Countermeasures are the protection measures that reduce the level of vulnerability to
threats. Existing safeguards that protect the asset against threats must be assessed. After
identifying the top priority assets with respect to vulnerability and criticality, the next
step is to implement countermeasures and reduce vulnerability below the acceptable
level. In case the existing measures are unlikely to be sufficient, either new
countermeasures need to be implemented or the existing ones strengthened. There are
three types of countermeasures. (Physical Security Risk Analysis, 2004)
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•

Preventive - This type countermeasure is designed to prevent damage or impact
from an action or event from occurring. Example: A fence around a bridge can
prevent attack to some extent.

•

Detective - These countermeasures provide some type of notification that
something has gone wrong. Example: Surveillance cameras.

•

Corrective or Responsive - Some countermeasures have the ability to correct
identified problems and respond to the emergency. Example: Training personnel
to respond to an attack.

An effective partnership between engineers, administrative officials and security agents is
essential to develop cost-effective countermeasures. Countermeasures are typically
developed specific to an asset type, based on the characteristics of an asset. They
commonly are in the form of work around the asset, strengthening the asset itself,
increasing detection capabilities, and developing plans and procedures to increase
security. Most of the countermeasures recommended for a physical asset are classified
based on their functionality, such as deterrence, detection and defense. The Army Field
Manual (2001) defines these terms as follows:
Deterrence – A potential aggressor who perceives a risk of being caught may be deterred
from attacking an asset. The effectiveness of deterrence varies with the aggressor’s
sophistication, the asset’s attractiveness, and the aggressor’s objective.

Detection – Detection senses an act of aggression, assesses the validity of the detection,
and communicates the appropriate information to a response force. A detection system
must provide all three of these capabilities to be effective.
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Defense – Defensive measures protect an asset from aggression by delaying or preventing
an aggressor’s movement toward the asset or by shielding the asset from weapons and
explosives. Defensive measures (1) delay aggressors from gaining access by using tools
in a forced entry, (2) prevent an aggressor’s movement toward an asset, and (3) protect
the asset from the effects of tools, weapons, and explosives.

Below are a list of potential countermeasures that can be adopted based on the nature and
the characteristic of the asset. There are based on the recommendations from AASHTO
and blue ribbon panel on bridges.
1. Increase inspection efforts to identify potential explosive devices as well as
increased or suspicious potential criminal activity.
2. Give personnel training to be more alert and aware of suspicious activities and
potentially dangerous packages, boxes, people, etc.
3.

Institute full-time surveillance at the most critical assets.

4. Eliminate parking under critical assets, such as key bridges. This could be done
by using concrete barriers.
5. Install security systems at DOT facilities with video capabilities, if feasible.
6. Install Mylar sheeting on inside of windows to protect employees from flying
glass in the case of an explosion in high employee incident areas.
7. Employ a full-time security officer to control access, at least to major buildings
such as headquarters.
8. Lock all access gates and install remote controlled gates where necessary.
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9. Limit access to all critical buildings through the issuance of a security badge with
specific types and levels of access identified and controlled through the card.
10. Add motion sensors to fences if it is cost effective.
11. Stricter enforcement of HAZMAT requirements.
12. Impose restrictions on flying zones around critical assets. This regulation would
reduce the accessibility to the asset and hence reduces vulnerability of the asset.
13. Protect suspension cable in case of suspension and cable stayed bridges.
14. Increased patrol by law enforcement and coast guard and port authorities
15. Immediate removal of abandoned and unclaimed vehicles near assets.
16. Removal of vegetation to provide clear lines of sight.
17. Apprise local law enforcement officials of critical assets.
18. Install advance warning systems in case of important assets. An example is when
the entry of every vehicle into a facility is detected and relayed to a monitoring
system when the vehicle is still in the driveway.
19. Introduce redundancies in the system, especially in the case of an emergency
route.

5.7.1. Choosing an Appropriate Countermeasure for an Asset
All the countermeasures listed above will not be equally effective for all assets. A
countermeasure needs to be customized based on the characteristic of the asset. A
countermeasure that will work for bridges may not be as effective in the case of
buildings. Given specific threats, the effectiveness of countermeasures is measured
subjectively by assessing how well its application reduces the potential for and
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consequences of attacks. As the risk increases, more and stronger measures should be
taken. Managers need to balance between demands for security and the resources needed
to enact and finance the measures. After identifying possible countermeasures for an
asset, the one that is most cost effective can be chosen for implementation. This can be
done by using the cost benefit analysis method. (Laboy-Rodriguez, 2005). The approach
should help establish a basis for evaluating and justifying investments, policies and
procedural changes. The analysis should include implementation, installation and
operating cost of the countermeasure. The benefits can be quantified based on how much
less vulnerable the asset is after countermeasure implementation. A countermeasure for
which benefits exceed the costs should be chosen. The effectiveness of the measure to
reduce vulnerability be should also be considered before implementation.
5.7.2. Response and Recovery Measures

The preceding section talks about the countermeasures that either deter or detect the
attack. There are countermeasures that help in recovering and restoring the asset.
Response is a countermeasure in the sense that effective response and recovery will
reduce the number of lives lost. The number of people affected is one of the factors
affecting vulnerability. Reducing the number of causalities will reduce vulnerability too.
In the case of response as a countermeasure, a disaster may require state and federal
agency involvement, activation of special plans and procedures, and extensive
coordination of personnel from multiple agencies. Emergency response plans will be
discussed in Volume II of this report.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS

A secure transportation system is critical to overall national security from terrorism. The
events of September 11th 2001 revealed the vulnerability of transportation systems.
Surface transportation is important because of its high visibility and public usage. The
need to strengthen security measures and to protect the transportation assets has caused
the transportation agencies to increase their efforts towards security. The results of such
efforts by the federal agencies are the reports published by AASHTO and NCHRP for
Vulnerability Assessment and Emergency Response. These reports guide state DOTs in
conducting Vulnerability Assessment. Because critical assets differ from state to state, it
is necessary for Indiana to assess its own assets and strengthen them against any possible
terrorist attacks. In order to strengthen an asset, it is essential to identify ‘which assets to
assess?’
To assist agencies in identifying the critical and vulnerable asset and evaluating
them for the security levels, this study focused on developing a prioritization method for
vulnerability assessment. Once the assets that are highly vulnerable and critical are
selected, suitable countermeasures are suggested for implementation. In order to compare
assets, there needs to be common measurable criteria. Because assets of different type are
considered in this research, identifying common criteria to measure the attributes of these
assets that reflect vulnerability is a challenging task. Because of the lack of such a
criterion, the study came up with definitions to measure vulnerability and criticality.
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Applying these definitions to assets resulted in indices that could be used to identify
critical and vulnerable assets.
6.1 Research Contributions
Terrorist attacks can cause massive damage to people, government, assets and economy
and such attacks are sudden and unexpected. The most effective strategy is to plan and in
advance to prevent such attacks. In order to prevent attacks and minimize disruption and
losses, the primary step is to identify what to protect. Because no agency has infinite
funds, it is critical to prioritize the assets so important assets can be protected first.
Because there are no common measurable characteristics for all asset types, identifying a
criteria for comparison is a challenging task.
The study developed a method that can be used to identify critical and vulnerable assets
among any asset types. The study identified common criteria based on subjective surveys
and expert knowledge to compare assets. Using these criteria, vulnerability and criticality
indices are obtained for each asset that can be used to prioritize assets. Once the assets
are prioritized in terms of their need for protective measures, appropriate
countermeasures can be implemented depending on the agencies available resources.
While conducting surveys, clear instructions need to be given to the experts as to the type
to the assets to be chosen, and the nature of the threat to consider. The experts need to be
trained to consider the most likely threat to the asset that would cause maximum
disruption. It is recommended that the assessment process be done as a group to reduce
the differences in the perception of the definitions of vulnerability and criticality and their
evaluation scales. Clear and consistent understanding of the definitions of vulnerability
and criticality will help in reduction in the variation in the results.
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6.2 Lessons Learned and Limitations
The study was mainly limited by the subjective nature of the responses and the difficulty
in obtaining data. Responses to the survey varied significantly because of the subjective
nature of the surveys. The difference in the perception and the interpretation of the
factors and the criteria and expert’s background and experience could be causes of the
variation. Also, because the assets were evaluated at the local level, the statewide
perspective is not incorporated into the evaluation process. The larger perspective may be
missing in the responses from the districts.
With different types of assets to compare and assess, there needs to be a common basis
for ranking. Because such measurable criteria do not exist for a wide variety of statewide
assets, this is not the most efficient way to identify the top priority assets. The solution
would be to split the assets into their respective categories, such as bridges, routes,
equipment and buildings. Assessment can be done within the asset groups using some of
the quantifiable or measurable criteria specific to those asset groups. For example, for
bridges, measures like span length, AADT and truck volume can be used to build a model.
And determine vulnerability and criticality values. Comparison using the vulnerability
and criticality indices among similar category assets would lead to more reliable results.
Once assets in the each of the categories are prioritized, you could gather a group of
experts in a common place and decide which assets to consider, based on the funding
availability and the needs and the mission of the agency.
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6.3 Recommendations for Further Research
The research here is a preliminary effort in the field of transportation security. Further
research in this topic is crucial to better understand the assessment of vulnerabilities of
assets and securing them. The following are some of the areas, where further research
will enhance the usability of the existing research.
1. Based on the vulnerability assessment conducted in this project, better and
consistent results could be obtained if the assessment was conducted as a
workshop instead of mail-in surveys. This could possibly reduce the variation in
the perception and understanding of various factors that influence vulnerability.
2. The shortcomings in the transportation security area are the absence of significant
methodological tools to prevent and manage terrorist attacks. Future studies could
concentrate on developing more quantitative tools and methods to evaluate
vulnerabilities of assets.
3. The quantitative methods would have large data needs regarding the
characteristics of assets. Studies should develop methods to obtain data to identify
the likelihood and the consequences of various disruptive events on transportation
systems.
4. Future research could also focus on developing models to assess and compare the
influences of various factors on component and system level vulnerability.
The data and the models will help decision-makers make informed decisions.
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5. There is also a need to clearly define the performance metrics to be used in risk
and vulnerability assessment analysis and standardize then. This would help in
comparing assets of different types for their vulnerability.
6. Further research could also concentrate on developing workshops to train
personnel in assessing vulnerabilities at the local, state and federal level.
7. To incorporate the subjectivity and the uncertainty in the input by the experts,
Fuzzy AHP could be used to obtain the criteria weights.
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